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A Developmental Approach to the 
Patent-Antitrust Interface 
By Thomas K. Cheng* 
Abstract: This Article proposes a set of guiding principles for approaching the 
patent-antitrust interface in developing countries. Based on the notion that 
antitrust doctrines need to be adjusted to reflect the local economic 
circumstances, this Article argues that any credible approach to the patent-
antitrust interface in developing countries must incorporate development 
considerations.  It proposes a set of guiding principles that takes into account a 
wide range of factors, including the need to provide innovation incentives, the 
need to facilitate domestic imitation, the need to protect domestic consumer 
welfare, and the need to safeguard access to basic necessities. With the support 
of a considerable body of theoretical and empirical economic literature, this 
Article challenges the widely held belief that patent protection is necessary for 
securing innovations. Rather, this Article argues that developing countries need 
to be skeptical about innovation-based justifications for restrictive patent 
exploitation practices, as many of them do not possess the capacity to take 
advantage of innovation incentives and can ill-afford to sacrifice consumer 
welfare. It concludes by highlighting the implicit challenge this Article poses to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The patent-antitrust interface is one of the most complex and vexing 
areas of antitrust law.  Professor Louis Kaplow characterizes it as “a source 
of perpetual confusion and controversy” and as a conflict “even more deep-
seated than is generally perceived.”1  This conflict stems from the fact that 
antitrust law prohibits the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power 
through exclusionary means while patent rights confer market power. 
Furthermore, it is said that antitrust law is chiefly concerned with static 
efficiency—the short-run price-cost performance of markets—and patent 
law with dynamic efficiency—the generation of patentee reward to spur 
innovation.  Commentators in the established antitrust jurisdictions, most of 
which are developed countries, have proposed various ways to resolve this 
conflict.  Some give primacy to competition while others emphasize the 
importance of pursuing dynamic efficiency.
2
  Yet others advocate solutions 
that require careful balancing of the policy considerations underpinning 
these two bodies of law.
3
  For example, Professor Louis Kaplow proposed a 
ratio test that determines the legality of a patent exploitation practice with 
reference to its relative impact on the consumer welfare loss and patentee 
reward.  Despite repeated attempts to formulate a definitive approach to the 
patent-antitrust interface, success has so far eluded most commentators.  
Reconciling patent and antitrust policies is even more difficult for 
developing countries.  Patent policy has crucial implications for 
development, as technological progress drives economic growth.  While the 
implications may seem to be that developing countries should emphasize 
patent policy, as they are further behind the global technological frontier 
and are in desperate need of domestic innovation, they can ill afford the 
short-term consumer welfare loss that must be incurred to generate patentee 
reward.  Given the widespread poverty in many developing countries, their 
consumers would be hard-pressed to bear the supra-competitive prices that 
 
 1  Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1813, 1815–16 (1984). 
 2  Ward Bowman, Jr. was one of the leading proponents of minimal competition law 
restrictions on the exercise of IPRs, while William Baxter advocated a stronger role for 
competition law in regulating the exercise of patent rights.  See generally William F. Baxter, 
Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE 
L.J. 267 (1966); WARD S. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973). 
 3  See Kaplow, supra note 1. 
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  Developing countries seem to be in a bind.  
Their antitrust enforcement authorities should be careful about sacrificing 
consumer welfare by upholding patent exploitation practices. 
To complicate matters further, many developing countries possess 
negligible technological capacity.  They have no meaningful prospects of 
attracting domestic innovations.  The need to generate innovation 
incentives, which underpins one side of the balance in the patent-antitrust 
interface, is weak.  This means that antitrust law should be even more 
hesitant to sacrifice consumer welfare as the innovation incentives 
generated by the patent system will not induce significant domestic 
innovation. The most realistic way for these countries to acquire 
technological capacity is to allow domestic producers to imitate foreign 
technology, which will endow these producers with the technical capability 
to pursue innovations in the future.  This means that patent protection 
should be lowered to facilitate imitation and licensing on favorable terms to 
the local producers. Finally, patent policy affects the incentives of 
multinational firms to transfer technology to, and undertake investment in, 
developing countries.  Foreign direct investment (FDI), in particular, may 
create significant benefits for the host economy in the form of increased 
employment, capital stock growth, and transfer of managerial know-how, 
all of which significantly contribute to economic growth and development.  
Developing countries must, hence, pay close attention to how the patent-
antitrust interface may affect FDI and technology transfer.  Lastly, the 
patent-antitrust interface in a developing country must incorporate 
developmental considerations, such as access to medicine and other basic 
necessities, which often hold the key to poverty alleviation and economic 
development.  Given these complex and sometimes conflicting 
considerations, some guiding principles are needed to approach the patent-
antitrust interface in developed countries. 
This Article is divided into eight parts.  Part II reviews some of the 
literature on the patent-antitrust interface from the two most established 
antitrust jurisdictions—the United States and the European Union (EU).  
The review concludes with the observation that resolution of the patent-
antitrust conflict must entail a balancing of some kind between static and 
dynamic efficiencies.  Part III provides the groundwork for adapting the 
balancing approach for developing countries by defining the meaning of 
economic growth and development as they pertain to the patent-antitrust 
interface.  This Part concludes with a summary of the main developmental 
considerations to be incorporated in the proposed guiding principles.  Part 
IV examines the widely-held belief that patent protection is necessary for 
securing innovations, and argues, with the support of a considerable amount 
 
 4  For a discussion of the definition of innovation incentives or incentives to innovate, see 
infra Part III.A.2. 
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of theoretical and empirical literature, that the belief is generally mistaken.  
The extent to which the belief is true depends on the industry at issue.  Part 
V investigates the relationships between the patent-antitrust interface and 
the three main forms of technology transfer: trade of technological goods, 
FDI, and technology licensing,  and suggests ways in which patent-antitrust 
rules should take these relationships into account.  Part VI introduces three 
further considerations for the patent-antitrust interface in developing 
countries: consumer welfare and deadweight loss, impaired access to basic 
necessities, and stifling of domestic innovation.  Part VII integrates all of 
the issues highlighted in the previous parts and puts forward some guiding 
principles for tackling the patent-antitrust interface in developing countries.  
Part VIII addresses two main criticisms of the proposed guiding principles: 
its compatibility with the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and administrability.  Part IX concludes the 
Article. 
II. RESOLVING THE PATENT-ANTITRUST CONFLICT—
BALANCING STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCIES 
The interface with patent law is one of the most challenging and 
technical areas of antitrust.
5
  What makes it so challenging is the fact that it 
juxtaposes two bodies of law that have ostensibly conflicting policy 
objectives, the reconciliation of which requires delicate balancing.  
Generally speaking, the focus of patent law is to encourage innovations by 
giving potential inventors a limited period of exclusivity so that they may 
recoup their investment through supra-competitive pricing.  Meanwhile, 
antitrust law protects consumer welfare by ensuring that firms compete on 
the merits and that consumers obtain goods and services at the lowest price 
and highest quality attainable in a competitive market.  In economic terms, 
patent law pursues dynamic efficiency, which is concerned with the 
generation of innovation over time, while antitrust law focuses on static 
efficiency, which is determined by the price-cost performance of the market 
at one point in time.  It should be obvious that there is an ostensible conflict 
 
 5  Many scholarly articles have been written about this area of law.  See generally Baxter, 
supra note 2; Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH L. REV. 37 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 253 (2009); Josef Drexl, Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One’s 
Own Ignorance: On the Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition 
Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 677 (2009); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006); 
Kaplow, supra note 1; David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment 
Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303 (2010); Willard K. Tom 
& Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to 
Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and 
Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1969). 
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between the means by which patent law promotes innovation—supra-
competitive pricing during the exclusivity period—and the antitrust 
objective of securing low prices for consumers. 
It has been argued, however, that this conflict is more apparent than 
real.
6
  Antitrust law pays attention to both static and dynamic efficiencies, 
and recognizes that the greatest welfare gains come not from competition-
driven lower prices for goods and services, but from technological 
advances.
7
  Meanwhile, patent law also considers the effects of patent 
exclusivity on consumers.  Implicit in the determination of the length and 
scope of patent rights is a balance between generating innovation incentives 
and allowing consumers affordable access to new technologies.
8
  Professor 
Herbert Hovenkamp argues that the conflict between patent and antitrust 
laws is “readily exaggerated.”9  With the two bodies of law sharing a 
common set of policy considerations, the resolution of the conflict between 
them, if one exists, can be achieved through a weighing of these 
considerations.
10
  The challenge is to create sufficient reward to potential 
innovators without unduly restricting consumers’ access to new 
technologies. 
This commonality of policy focus should not be exaggerated, however.  
Despite their shared concerns about static and dynamic efficiencies, patent 
and antitrust laws take different approaches to weighing these efficiencies.  
Patent law’s main focus remains the provision of innovation incentives, 
which spawns corollary issues, such as patentability and the scope of patent 
rights.
11
  Despite the need to balance innovation incentives and consumer 
welfare loss, rarely is consumer welfare explicitly considered in patent 
cases.  If consumer welfare was ever explicitly weighed, it was at the 
legislative stage when Congress determined the length and scope of patent 
protection.
12
  Judges tend to see patent issues, such as non-obviousness, as 
 
 6  SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 161 (2004). 
 7  HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., 1 IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 1, at 13 (2d ed. 2010). 
 8  Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1823–28. 
 9  Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Antitrust Policy in an Age of IP Expansion 3 (Univ. 
of Iowa Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=634224. 
 10  For alternative views on how to resolve the patent-antitrust conflict, see Pierre 
Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and 
Competition Law: an Economic Approach, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 505 (Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007); Carrier, 
supra note 5, at 799–800; Crane, supra note 5; Drexl, supra note 5. 
 11  SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, at 103–11. 
 12  This is especially true in the pharmaceutical context, where Congress must balance the 
need to generate innovation incentives and the provision of affordable medicine to the 
public.  See SHAYERAH ILIAS & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL40607, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES 
  
A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface 
33:1 (2012) 
7 




Antitrust pays closer attention to dynamic efficiency considerations.  
When deciding cases arising in technological sectors, antitrust courts are 
mindful of the impact of its decisions on innovation incentives.  An 
example is Microsoft v. United States, in which the D.C. Circuit, despite the 
weight of Supreme Court precedents, refused to apply the per se rule to 
Microsoft’s tying of Internet Explorer to Windows.  The rationale for the 
refusal was that the “novel, purported efficiencies” of such an integration of 
functionalities means that applying per se condemnation to such a tie 
“might stunt valuable innovation.”14  Yet one may argue that antitrust has 
not developed adequate analytical tools for evaluating innovation-based 
claims as opposed to static efficiency claims, which remain the main 
concern for antitrust.  When antitrust courts are faced with countervailing 
static and dynamic efficiencies, their response is usually to downplay the 
conflict or subordinate one to the other without balancing.
15
  This is 
illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s assessment of the Section 2 claim against 
Microsoft for creating a new Java Virtual Machine that was incompatible 
with the existing one developed by Sun Microsystems.
16
  The court was 
unwilling to second-guess the veracity of Microsoft’s innovation even 
though there was ample evidence that Microsoft had developed its own Java 
Virtual Machine with the express goal to create confusion in the market and 
to undermine Sun’s product.17  Purported dynamic efficiency gains trumped 
proven static efficiency loss in the case. 
Having seen that patent and antitrust laws are not in an irreconcilable 
conflict, we are still left with a crucial question—how should the balance be 
struck?  The foregoing discussion suggests weighing static against dynamic 
efficiencies.  However, weighing of policy considerations is an inexact 
exercise in which the outcome depends on the weight attached to the 
individual factors.  If innovations are to be pursued to the greatest extent 
possible, even at the cost of substantial short-term consumer welfare losses, 
dynamic efficiency considerations must reign supreme. Antitrust defers to 
patent policy, and minimizes interference with patent exploitation and 
licensing practices.  If instead the emphasis is placed on protection of 
consumer welfare, antitrust restrictions on a patentee’s freedom of action 
 
2 (2009). 
 13  KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2007); Roanwell Corp. v. 
Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004, 1006 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 
(1966); SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, at 107. 
 14  United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 90–92 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 15  Commentators have argued that it is in fact not unfeasible to attempt such balancing.  
See Carrier, supra note 5, at 799–800. 
 16  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 55. 
 17  Id. at 77. 
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III. INCORPORATING DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN 
THE PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERFACE 
For developing countries tackling the patent-antitrust interface, what is 
already a delicate balancing exercise takes on even greater complexity.  
This is due to the fact that developing country antitrust authorities need to 
look at a broader range of considerations than mere static and dynamic 
efficiencies.  This need is largely derived from the fact that these authorities 
must take into account the impact of the interface on economic growth and 
development, which is the paramount challenge facing developing 
countries. 
The fundamental premise of this Article is that the analytical approach 
to antitrust issues needs to be tailored to the economic circumstances of a 
particular country.  Antitrust, being an area of economic regulation, must be 
applied with sensitivity to the economic environment in which it operates.  
The kind of adjustments called for here are not variations in enforcement 
priorities, but changes in the substantive analytical framework that is 
applied to specific antitrust issues.  The need for adjustment is particularly 
pressing for developing countries, whose economies differ so significantly 
from industrialized nations that analytical approaches that have worked in 
the latter could prove to be unsuitable for the former.  And most analytical 
tools in antitrust were developed with industrialized economies in mind.  
This is not to say that every area of antitrust law needs to be altered to suit 
developing countries.  Cartel enforcement, for example, is unlikely to differ 
significantly across jurisdictions.  There is an unusual consensus within 
antitrust circles that cartels are detrimental to consumers and society in 
general and should be condemned in developed and developing countries 
alike.
19
  There are areas of antitrust law, however, that are sensitive to the 
particular economic circumstances of a country, and need to be adjusted 
accordingly.  The patent-antitrust interface is one of them. 
There are a number of reasons that a different approach to the patent-
antitrust interface is needed for developing countries.  First, and most 
obviously, is that developing countries’ capacity to innovate differs from 
that of industrialized economies.  While generating adequate innovation 




 18  Income to poor developing country consumers is worth more because of diminishing 
marginal utility of money.  See Frederic M. Scherer, A Note on Global Welfare in 
Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 WORLD ECON. 1127, 1131–32 (2004). 
 19  Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi, Criminalising Cartels: Why Critical Studies?, in 
CRIMINALISING CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 
4 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011). 
 20  For an overview of the range of innovation policy initiatives of the U.S. government, 
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developing countries simply may not have the potential inventors to benefit 
from patentee rewards.  The need to provide innovation incentives is less 
pressing in developing countries. 
Developing countries, of course, cannot be treated as a monolith.  
They range from newly industrialized nations, such as South Korea and 
Taiwan, to the least-developed nations of sub-Saharan Africa.
21
  While the 
majority of the least-developed nations do not possess significant 
innovative capacity, the newly industrialized developing countries are 
highly advanced in certain high-technology sectors.  South Korea is a world 
leader in consumer electronics; Taiwan a powerhouse in the production of 
semiconductors; and Brazil a leading innovator of agricultural technology.
22
  
Even the least-developed nations may possess limited innovative capacity 
in certain sectors.  Therefore, sweeping generalizations must be avoided.  
Yet, the fact remains that industrialized economies possess vastly superior 
innovative capacity as compared to developing countries.  This is 
demonstrated by the fact that OECD countries accounted for 78% of the 
research and development (R&D) expenditure globally in 2005 while 
developing countries accounted for only about 23%.
23
  This figure would 
drop to 14.8% if one excluded China, which, due to the size of its economy 
and its unique economic circumstances, should be treated as sui generis, 




see David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, The U.S. National Innovation System, in 
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 
1993). 
 21  Sub-Saharan African countries include Uganda, Rwanda, Mali, Niger, to name but a 
few.  One may in fact argue that, given their high level of educational attainment, general 
availability of high quality healthcare, and impressive manufacturing and innovative 
capacities in technological sectors, such as semiconductors and consumer electronics, it is no 
longer accurate to classify South Korea and Taiwan as developing countries. 
 22  Abby Schultz, How South Korea Became a Consumer Product Juggernaut, CNBC 
(July 16, 2012, 2:39 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48041792/How_South_Korea_Became_a_Consumer_Product_Jugg
ernaut; DEP’T. OF INV. SERVS., TAIWAN MINISTRY OF ECON. AFFAIRS, SEMICONDUCTOR 
INDUSTRY: ANALYSIS AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2008),  available at 
http://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/doc/industry/15Semiconductor_Industry_eng.pdf (noting that 
the top two semiconductor manufacturers in the world are Taiwanese companies); Pedro A. 
Arraes Pereira et al., The Development of Brazilian Agriculture: Future Technological 
Challenges and Opportunities, AGRICULTURE & FOOD SECURITY 1, 2 (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://www.agricultureandfoodsecurity.com/content/pdf/2048-7010-1-4.pdf (highlighting 
Brazilian innovations in agricultural technology). 
 23  Jacques Gaillard, Measuring Research and Development in Developing Countries: 
Main Characteristics and Implications for Frascati Manual, 15 SCI., TECHNOLOGY & SOC’Y, 
77, 95–96 (2010). 
 24  China alone contributed 8.9% of the world’s R&D expenditure in 2007.  UNESCO INST. 
OF STAT., GLOBAL INVESTMENTS IN R&D (2011), available at 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/FactSheets/Documents/fs15_2011-investments-en.pdf. 
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Second, as suggested earlier, developing countries need to focus on 
economic growth and development.  While development is an ongoing 
process for every country, and no country can relax from the pursuit of 
economic progress, developing countries face a much more urgent task of 
improving the livelihood of their people.  Given the importance of 
technological progress in spurring economic growth
25
 and the potentially 
significant impact of antitrust rules on patent exploitation on innovation and 
technology transfer, developing countries need to tread carefully when 
approaching patent-antitrust issues.  If adopting a permissive attitude 
toward patent exploitation practices will facilitate technology transfer to 
such an extent that the consequent boost to the economy outweighs 
consumer harm, a developing country will do well to give greater freedom 
of action to patentees.  If the economic benefits turn out to be less 
substantial, a developing country should instead take a more pro-antitrust 
stance. 
Third, antitrust in developing countries cannot be exclusively 
concerned with the pursuit of economic efficiency, because markets in 
those countries are likely to behave differently from those in developed 
countries.  Markets are often less dynamic in developing countries and 
potential market entrants are often less abundant.  For example, in 
developed countries, especially the United States, it is often argued that 
predatory pricing should only be condemned if the monopolist has a 
reasonable prospect for recouping its loss.
26
  If new entrants can easily enter 
the market to undercut the supra-competitive price imposed by the 
monopolist after it has successfully driven out existing rivals, consumers do 
not suffer any harm.
27
  While this assumption may be valid in an 
industrialized economy with dynamic markets like the United States, it is 
less applicable in developing countries.  In some developing countries, 
entrepreneurship is so limited and new market entry so rare and difficult to 
achieve that no new entrants may come by during the recoupment period. 
This observation is corroborated by a report published by the International 
Development Research Centre in Canada.  Concerning adjustments in a 
Peruvian market after trade liberalization, the report states: 
While the elimination of inefficiency is economically a laudable 
goal, the projected transfer of resources from less productive uses to 
more productive uses did not occur due to a lack of capital and 
entrepreneurship. Thus, rather than creating new jobs, trade 
liberalization resulted in the destruction of many of the few jobs that 
 
 25  For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infra Part III.A.1. 
 26  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) 
(requiring reasonable prospect of recoupment as one element of predatory pricing claim). 
 27  Id. at 224. 
  






Developing country antitrust authorities should avoid facile, or 
sometimes heroic, assumptions about the competitive vitality of their 
markets.  This observation will be highly relevant to the patent-antitrust 
interface in developing countries. 
A.  Definitions of Economic Growth and Development 
Before exploring how the needs of economic growth and development 
can be taken into account in the patent-antitrust interface in developing 
countries, one needs to define these two terms.  The two terms, in fact, have 
distinct meanings and have been studied extensively by economists.  
Economists have long been fascinated by the relationship between 
technological progress and economic growth.  In particular, a considerable 
amount of economic research has been devoted to the question of the 
contribution of technological progress to economic growth.  This question 
is of particular relevance to the patent-antitrust interface.  To the extent that 
an increased scope of patent exploitation increases patentee reward, which 
promotes innovation, which in turn propels growth, the patent-antitrust 
interface should be tilted in favor of patent policy.  Conversely, if other 
factors intervene in this causal chain and the relationship between scope of 
patent exploitation and economic growth turns out to be more tenuous, 
consumer welfare loss is more likely to outweigh dynamic efficiency gains.  
In this scenario, antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation practices should 
be tightened. 
1.  Economic Growth 
Economic growth has been defined “as an historical process of 
structural change in the broadest sense.”29  Despite this broad definition, 
and partly due to the difficulty with measurement and quantification of 
structural changes, economists have tended to use increase in per capita 
income as an indication of economic growth.  The economic study of 
growth can be said to have begun with Nobel Laureate Robert Solow, who 
published his seminal work on the topic in 1956.
30
  Following Solow’s 
pioneering work in the area, economists attempted to explain the 
relationship between technological progress and economic growth by way 
 
 28  STEWART ET AL., INT’L DEV. RESEARCH CTR., COMPETITION LAW IN ACTION: 
EXPERIENCES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (2007). 
 29  Bart Verspagen, Innovation and Economic Growth, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INNOVATION  486, 488 (Jan Fagerberg et al. eds., 2005). 
 30  Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 QUARTERLY 
J. ECON. 65 (1956). 
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of a concept known as total factor productivity (TFP).
31
  Economists 
identify three sources of economic growth: growth in labor; growth in 
capital, such as machinery; and TFP growth.
32
  Technological progress, 
which affects TFP, is taken to be an exogenous variable.
33
  Using this 
method, economists have concluded that more than half of the variation in 
per capita income can be attributable to differences in TFP.
34
  Ever since 
Solow’s work, there has been a general consensus among economists that 
“research and development is a major source of economic growth . . . . 
[M]ost studies show a high correlation between R&D expenditures and 
productivity growth after accounting for investment in ordinary capital.”35 
Solow’s model is not without problems, however.  First, many 
economists have been critical of the TFP concept because of difficulties 
with conceptualization and measurement.
36
  Second, and more importantly, 
the results of Solow’s model have not been borne out by actual data.  
Solow’s model, which attributes growth to factor accumulation, predicts 
declining growth rate over time.
37
  This is largely due to diminishing 
marginal productivity of factors of production.
38
  But this prediction is 
inconsistent with observed data.
39
  To reconcile the inconsistency between 
theoretical predictions and real-world observations, “technological change 
has to be rising over time, and rising fast enough to overcome the curtailing 
effects of accumulation.”40  Subsequent economists, such as Paul Romer, 
developed what has come to be known as endogenous growth models that 
attempt to account for this accelerated technological change, which is 
needed for long-term growth rates to be non-declining.
41
 
Endogenous growth models, such as Romer’s, identify R&D 
spillovers
42
 as a central cause for non-declining growth.
43
  R&D spillovers 
 
 31  Verspagen, supra note 29, at 490. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 489. 
 34  ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 34 (2004). 
 35  Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-
Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, 159 (2006). 
 36  Verspagen, supra note 29, at 489–90.  It has been said that using TFP to explain the 
residual of growth accounting relies on a number of strong assumptions, which are likely to 
be violated in practice.  This means that the residual is likely to include many more factors 
than simply the contribution of technology.  Also, many of the factors incorporated in 
growth accounting calculations “are interrelated by causal links not accounted for by the 
underlying theory.”  Id. at 490. 
 37  HELPMAN, supra note 34, at 35. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71 (1990). 
 42  R&D spillovers can be understood as the externality of innovation.  It refers to the fact 
that a considerable portion of the benefits of an innovation are not appropriated by the 
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eliminate the problem of diminishing returns to the aggregate knowledge of 
an economy, which was a main culprit for declining growth in Solow’s 
model.  It is important to emphasize that R&D spillovers do not eliminate 
diminishing returns to private knowledge—the technological knowledge 
accumulated by one firm still exhibits diminishing returns.
44
  What it does 
eliminate is diminishing returns to the aggregate knowledge of the 
economy.  What one firm learns from another firm’s innovation will 
improve the productivity of the first firm’s R&D.45  In other words, there 
are considerable externalities for R&D that keep technological knowledge 
productive and economies growing at non-declining rates.  Professor 
Elhanan Helpman describes this process as follows: 
In the model, innovators aim to invent new products, which provide 
them with profits and thereby an incentive to innovate.  But 
inadvertently, they also create knowledge that is not embodied in 
blueprints and cannot be retained as a trade secret.  This 
“disembodied” knowledge becomes available to other innovators and 
thereby reduces future R&D costs for everyone.  Under these 
circumstances, the stock of knowledge available to innovators is a 
function of past R&D efforts.  The more R&D was performed in the 
past the larger this stock and the cheaper it is to do R&D today. . . .  




Economic research has confirmed the existence of R&D spillovers.
47
 
The economic literature on growth is vast and complex and the 
 
innovator itself but are shared by others.  WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET 
INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 5 (2002). 
 43  See Romer, supra note 41. at S89. 
 44  See HELPMAN, supra note 34, at 38. 
 45  For example, the success of a pharmaceutical research project is enhanced by the 
success of related programs in other firms.  William S. Comanor, The Economics of 
Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry, in PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 65 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007); Gilbert, supra note 35, at 
202. 
 46  HELPMAN, supra note 34, at 44. 
 47  See, e.g., Jeffrey Bernstein & Ishaq Nadiri, Research and Development and Intra-
industry Spillovers: An Empirical Implication of Dynamic Duality, 56 REV. ECON. STUD. 
249, 249 (1989); Jeffrey Bernstein, The Structure of Canadian Inter-industry R&D 
Spillovers, and the Rates of Return to R&D, 37 J. INDUS. ECON. 315 (1989); Timothy F. 
Bresnahan, Measuring Spillovers from Technical Advance: Mainframe Computers in 
Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 742 (1986); Akira Goto & Kazuyuki Suzuki, R&D 
Capital, Rate of Return on R&D Investment and Spillover of R&D in Japanese 
Manufacturing Industries, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 555 (1989); Adam B. Jaffe, 
Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms’ Patents, Profits, 
and Market Value, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 984 (1986). 
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foregoing merely attempts to provide a brief overview of essential concepts 
for the purposes of this Article.  This discussion yields a number of 
important lessons for the patent-antitrust interface in developing countries.  
First, it is clear that in order to promote economic growth, not only do 
developing countries need to spur innovation and build domestic innovative 
capacity, they should also adopt policies that facilitate R&D spillovers.  
Helpman confines his discussion of spillover to disembodied or tacit 
knowledge, sometimes also known as know-how, which generally refers to 
non-patentable technical knowledge that is nonetheless essential for a firm 
to implement an invention.
48
  This need not be the case, however, since 
spillover applies to patented knowledge as well.  Economists have observed 
that knowledge spillover, including that of patented knowledge, takes place 
by way of patent applications and trade shows.
49
  It is not uncommon for a 
rival firm to learn about a new technology through patent applications and 
utilize the technical knowledge contained in the applications to invent 
around the patent.  Moreover, and more importantly for the purposes of this 
Article, antitrust law can facilitate R&D spillover by making it easier for 
rivals to obtain and utilize patented knowledge.  This can be accomplished 
by restricting the scope of patent protection and exploitation. 
The second important lesson for developing countries is the need to 
adopt pro-active policies to promote technological progress and to pursue 
growth.  While Solow’s model suggests that countries will converge to a 
common steady state growth rate, the endogenous growth models only 
predict conditional convergence: “[T]his work leads to the conclusion that 
steady state growth rates differ between nations.  Growth rates may 
converge toward a country-specific steady state growth path at best (so-
called conditional convergence), leading to the divergence of growth paths 
among countries.”50  In other words, developing countries cannot rely on 
their supposedly higher returns to knowledge accumulation—because of 
their start from a lower base—and convergence of growth rates to catch up 
with developed countries.  Instead, they need to pursue policies that actively 
promote technological progress.  Empirical studies have confirmed that the 
 
 48  Professor Keith Maskus illustrates the concept of tacit knowledge by positing that 
“[g]aining access to blueprints of a complex technology is of little competitive advantage in 
itself unless there is also a way to determine how to use it efficiently.”  KEITH E. MASKUS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 136 (2000); see also Edwin 
Mansfield, Mark Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical 
Study, 91 THE ECON. J. 907, 910 (1981) (showing that tacit knowledge allows a firm to 
implement a complex technology from the blueprints and to use it efficiently); Frederic M. 
Scherer, The Economics of the Patent System, in INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 439, 445 (Frederic M. Scherer ed., 1980). 
 49  Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 1987(3) BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 806–07 (1987). 
 50  Verspagen, supra note 29, at 506. 
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conditions for catching up have become increasingly unfavorable over time, 
and more innovative efforts are required of the technological laggards.
51
  To 
the extent the patent-antitrust interface can influence technology transfer, 
developing countries may wish to consider using antitrust law as a policy 
tool to accelerate catching up. 
2.  Development 
While economic growth generally refers to increase in per capita 
income, the concept of development is considerably broader and more 
multi-faceted.  The academic literature on development is vast and varied.  
Nonetheless, development literature can be roughly classified into two 
schools of thought, which Professor Margaret Chon calls the Neoliberal 
school and the Skeptical school.
52
 
The main dividing line between these two schools is their respective 
faith in the ability of free market policies to deliver development.  The 
Neoliberal school believes that development effort should focus on 
achieving economic growth attained through a range of liberalizing policies, 
such as dismantling of trade barriers, encouragement of FDI, simplification 
of taxation system, removal of market-distorting government policies, 
enhanced protection of property rights, liberalization of previously 
regulated industries, paring down of the state-owned sector and divestiture 
of state-owned enterprises, and improved protection of intellectual 
property.
53
  Neoliberals believe that economic growth and efficiency are the 
main focus of development.  Distributive concerns are not given much 
weight under the presumption that the wealth generated by pro-growth 
liberal policies will eventually trickle down to the poor.  On the intellectual 
property front, the TRIPS Agreement is the culmination of this Neoliberal 
view of development.
54
  The implicit rationale behind requiring developing 
countries to heighten intellectual property protection is that these countries 
will only develop innovative capacity by protecting domestic innovators 
from free-riding.  As Chon notes, “Integrating intellectual property 
standards through TRIPS is supposed to result in long term economic 
growth through innovation across all member states, at the cost of short 
term decreases in access to goods because of higher prices.”55 
 
 51  See Jan Fagerberg & Bart Verspagen, Technology-gaps, Innovation Diffusion and 
Transformation: an Evolutionary Interpretation, 31 RES. POL’Y. 1291, 1302 (2002) (using, 
as technological laggards, countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Turkey). 
 52  Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2821, 2853–63 (2005–2006). 
 53  Id. at 2863. 
 54  Id. at 2864. 
 55  Id. at 2866. 
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The Skeptical approaches to development focus on “historically-
driven, path-dependent, structural impediments to development.”56  Some 
proponents of these approaches believe that obstacles to development are 
legacies of colonization.
57
  Others attribute slowed growth to path-
dependency and economic determinism.
58
  Some present feminist critiques 
of the discourse on development.
59
  What all Skeptics share is a common 
opposition to the Neoliberal vision for development, especially its emphasis 
on growth and market liberalization as a panacea for the woes of developing 
countries.  To them, development must mean not only higher economic 
growth, but also inclusive growth that benefits different socio-economic 
classes.  Development must permit the satisfaction of basic human needs, 
such as education and health care.  Only with satisfaction of these basic 
needs can individuals fulfill their full potential.  This broader vision of 
development is best encapsulated by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen: 
The ends and means of development require examination and 
scrutiny for a fuller understanding of the development process; it is 
simply not adequate to take as our basic objective just the 
maximization of income or wealth, which is, as Aristotle noted, 
“merely useful and for the sake of something else.”  For the same 
reason, economic growth cannot sensibly be treated as an end in 
itself.  Development has to be more concerned with enhancing the 
lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy.
60
 
In short, development needs to be more broadly conceptualized than a 
singular focus on economic growth.  At the very least, economic growth 
must be accompanied by a somewhat equitable distribution of income.  
Development policies must not wait idly by while the increased wealth 
trickles down the social ladder.  Moreover, development policies must 
endeavor to improve access to basic services.  With respect to patent 
protection, one can easily imagine the Skeptics’ distrust of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  They question the merits of imposing heightened patent 
protection requirements on developing countries.
61
 
The Skeptics’ view has found an unlikely supporter.  Although not a 
development scholar, economist Professor William Baumol has opined on 
the importance of the distribution of the benefits of innovation to economic 
 
 56  Id. at 2868. 
 57  Tayyab Mahmud, Postcolonial Imaginaries, Alternative Development or Alternatives 
to Development?, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 26 (1999). 
 58  See generally RICHARD PEET & ELAINE HARTWICK, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT 14 
(1999). 
 59  SHAWN MEGHAN BURN, WOMEN ACROSS CULTURES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 133–57 
(2000). 
 60  AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14 (1999). 
 61  Chon, supra note 52, at 2867. 
  





  He forcefully argues that society is better off if 
the benefits of innovation are not reserved to the originator of the 
innovation, but spread broadly among members of society.
63
  This is so 
even if the spillover of benefits beyond the innovator slightly reduces 
innovation incentives: 
The reason a zero spillover level is not optimal is that, though 
spillovers are a disincentive for investment in innovation (as most of 
the literature contend), they are at the same time significant benefits 
in themselves. A major component of these spillovers is the resulting 
(spectacular) increase in economic welfare of the population as a 
whole, so that innovation does not just benefit direct participants in 
the innovation process. Indeed, these spillovers, in the form of 
resulting rises in general living standards, are arguably the prime 
social benefits of innovation.
64
 
Spillovers from innovation boost the well-being of the general public 
by improving access to healthcare and education, which in turn gives 
society a more productive and educated workforce.  Baumol notes that if 
spillovers from innovation were successfully kept at zero, “the living 
standards of the vast majority of the citizens of today’s rich countries would 
have stalled at pre-Industrial Revolution levels.”65  He proceeds to conclude 
that low or even zero spillovers, which can be achieved by expanding 
intellectual property rights and stepping up enforcement, are far from 
socially optimal.  Innovation incentives need to be sacrificed to obtain these 
distributive social benefits, even at the expense of higher absolute growth.
66
  
In fact, Baumol questions whether permitting substantial spillovers will 
necessarily undermine innovation.  He refers to Japan, where patent 
protection is considerably weaker than the United States, as an example of a 
country where spillovers are probably substantial, but innovations 
nonetheless abundant.
67
  The relatively weaker patent protection available 
in Japan may have spurred Japanese firms to enter into technology-sharing 
arrangements, which have in turn allowed for the rapid dissemination of 
innovations, and for growth in productivity. 
This willingness to sacrifice innovation incentives is all the more 
remarkable given that Baumol is an innovation economist.  His view further 
buttresses the Skeptics’ position that a development strategy focusing solely 
or predominantly on wealth creation and economic efficiency is likely to be 
 
 62  BAUMOL, supra note 42, at 121. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. (italics added). 
 65  Id. at 125. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. at 141. 
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deficient.  Development strategy generally, and its application to the patent-
antitrust interface in particular, must account for the distributive 
consequences of government policy. 
B.  A Summary of Developmental Considerations 
Reconciling these two schools of development thinking is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  A number of useful insights, however, can be gleaned 
to guide our exploration of the patent-antitrust interface in developing 
countries.  First, both schools agree that economic growth is an important 
component of development.  The Skeptics challenge the Neoliberal view 
that economic growth is the be-all-end-all of development.  Nonetheless, no 
viable development policies can afford to overlook economic growth.  The 
first and foremost issue in this Article is a possible role for the patent-
antitrust interface in promoting technological progress, and hence, 
economic growth.  This is consistent with the earlier discussion of 
economic analysis of growth by Solow and Romer. 
Second, after the demise of the Washington Consensus, it is 
increasingly questioned whether a singular focus on economic growth to the 
neglect of income distribution and the satisfaction of basic human needs is a 
sound development policy.
68
  Inclusive growth that pays at least some 
attention to how the newly generated wealth is distributed is highly 
important.  The welfare benefits of such inclusive growth have been noted 
by Baumol.
69
  Antitrust law is certainly not in the business of redistributing 
income, nor is it an appropriate mechanism for rationing access to basic 
services, but it can at least pay some heed to how its doctrines affect the 
poor, who are more likely to be consumers than producers.  Consumer 
welfare loss by the poor should be minimized because of the diminishing 
marginal utility of money.  The loss of every dollar bites at low levels of 
income.  In particular, in resolving the patent-antitrust conflict, a greater 
regard for the poor means that monopoly loss should not be lightly imposed 
on consumers in order to encourage innovation.  The extra money that 
developing country consumers need to spend to generate patentee reward is 
a much more precious resource to them.  This is especially so if the 
patented product at issue is a basic necessity, the demand for which is 
inelastic. 
Third, the patent-antitrust interface should take into account, to the 
extent possible, access to basic services.  The most notable example is 
medicine.  The TRIPS Agreement already contains mechanisms for 
developing countries to order compulsory licensing of patented medicine in 
 
 68  Sen, supra note 60, at 3–4. 
 69  BAUMOL, supra note 42, at 121. 
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times of a public health emergency.
70
  In cases involving medicine, 
foodstuffs, and other necessities, consumer interest in obtaining them at 
lower prices, the denial of which may result in hunger and malnutrition, 
should be accorded greater weight. 
Fourth, inclusive growth also means encouraging indigenous 
entrepreneurship.  One way to alleviate economic inequality in developing 
countries is to ensure that business opportunities are open to the poor.  The 
poor’s participation in the market is likely to be through small- and 
medium-sized businesses.
71
  Without causing undue interference with the 
market and sacrifice of economic efficiency, some weight should be given 
to the interests of these enterprises when resolving the patent-antitrust 
conflict. 
To sum up, while industrialized economies may only focus on the 
tradeoff between consumer welfare and innovation incentives when tackling 
the patent-antitrust interface, developing countries must consider a broader 
range of issues: (1) how technological progress affects their growth 
prospects and conditions for catching up; (2) how consumer welfare loss is 
distributed within their societies; (3) how the patent-antitrust interface 
affects access to basic necessities; and (4) how a more pro-antitrust stance 
may facilitate or impede technology transfer, both authorized and 
unauthorized, especially to small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
Before attempting to incorporate these considerations into the patent-
antitrust interface, one must revert to a crucial issue that has been alluded to 
a few times in this Article—the extent to which patent protection spurs 
innovation.  This is an issue that warrants close scrutiny by developing 
countries.  If the causal link between patentee reward and innovation is 
weak, there is a strong argument for developing countries to shift the 
balance in favor of antitrust policy.  On the contrary, if the link is strong, 
developing countries that have innovative capacity should approach the 
patent-antitrust interface cautiously and avoid undue restrictions of patent 
exploitation practices.  This issue is explored in the next Part. 
IV. INNOVATION INCENTIVES AND THE PATENT-ANTITRUST 
INTERFACE 
As far as innovation incentives in developing countries are concerned, 
one must distinguish domestic innovation from global or external 
innovation.  In today’s globalized world, the innovation incentives 
generated by a patent system extend beyond domestic borders and may 
affect foreign firms.  The extent to which a shift in the patent-antitrust 
 
 70  CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 89–94 (2000). 
 71  ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF 
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interface in developing countries affects innovation by developed country 
firms is an interesting issue examined infra Part IV.D. 
The central issue in this Part is whether tighter antitrust restrictions on 
patent exploitation will undermine domestic innovation in developing 
countries.  The relevance of this issue hinges on the existence of domestic 
innovative capacity in a certain sector.  If there is no innovative capacity in 
a particular industry, the innovation incentives generated by the patent 
system will redound no benefit to the domestic economy.  One may retort 
that even if innovative capacity is currently absent, patent protection may 
attract potential innovators.  While there is some validity to this argument, 
for certain technology-intensive sectors, there is simply no hope for some 
developing countries to develop any innovative capacity in the foreseeable 
future.
72
  There is no reason to incur valuable consumer welfare loss to 
generate or maintain innovation incentives in these sectors.  Therefore, if a 
developing country currently possesses no innovative capacity in a certain 
sector, and has no prospect of doing so in the near future, maintenance of 
innovation incentives should be a low priority.  The issue is different for 
developing countries that possess innovative capacity in particular sectors.  
For these countries, the extent to which tighter antitrust restrictions on 
patent exploitation will undermine innovation incentives is a matter of 
grave concern.  It is this topic to which the ensuing discussion will turn. 
The general belief is that patent protection is needed to generate 
innovation incentives, and that society would be worse off with reduced 
patent protection due to a loss of innovation.
73
  As it turns out, there is a 
considerable amount of both theoretical and empirical economic literature 
that cast doubt on these beliefs.  The extent to which patent protection is 
needed to secure innovations varies across industries.  While patent 
protection is important for some industries, such as pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals,
74
 it plays a much more attenuated role in attracting innovative 
efforts in others.  This insight will have important implications for the 
patent-antitrust interface in developing countries. 
 
 72  CORREA, supra note 70, at 140.  Correa argues that introducing patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals will not spur domestic R&D in pharmaceuticals in developing countries, 
because “the development of new chemical entities is outside the reach of local companies in 
any developing country, since there are no firms in such countries big enough (in terms of 
total sales) to finance the high costs of pharmaceutical R&D.”  Id. at 43.  He further argues 
that “[t]he high investment required for mass chip production and the intensity and cost of 
R&D in an extremely competitive market constitute formidable barriers for potential new 
entrants, particularly those from developing countries.”  Id. at 140. 
 73  See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004). 
 74  See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 212–
42 (2008) (challenging the view that patent protection is important in pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries). 
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A.  Some Definitions 
Before turning to the relevant literature, it is important to first define a 
number of key terms. These terms are key to understanding the entire 
debate about whether patent protection is necessary to spur innovation. 
1.  Invention vs. Innovation 
Invention and innovation have been used somewhat interchangeably 
thus far in this Article.  Economists have in fact used them to refer to 
different things.  According to some economists, “Invention refers to the 
creation of new knowledge, and innovation (or commercialization) refers to 
the development of marketable products from that knowledge.”75  
Innovation, hence, includes “design, production, marketing and the rest of 
the myriad activities that contribute to the making of things.”76  While 
invention and innovation usually go hand in hand, Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter notes that “[i]nnovation is possible without anything we 
should identify as invention, and invention does not necessarily induce 
innovation, but produces of itself . . . no economically relevant effect at 
all.”77  Because innovation encompasses invention and much more, the 
costs of innovation substantially exceed invention costs.
78
 
Economists have long debated whether the patent system should only 
provide incentives to invent, or whether patentee reward should also cover 
innovation costs.
79
  This is important because invention does not necessarily 
lead to innovation and commercialization. Society as a whole must decide 
whether innovation is itself a sufficiently valuable activity that needs to be 
encouraged through policy intervention.  While some have argued that the 
patent system should only be concerned with inventions,
80
 the consensus in 
recent literature seems to be that innovation costs should be taken into 
account by the patent system.
81
  This Article makes no attempt to settle this 
 
 75  Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in 
China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH 295, 299 (Carsten Fink & Keith M. Maskus eds., 2005) (emphasis in original). 
 76  Stuart Macdonald, Exploring the Hidden Costs of Patents, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 13, 23 (Peter Drahos & Ruth 
Mayne eds., 2002). 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. at 23 (“It is important to remember that of the total resources required for 
innovation, only a small proportion comes from invention; the majority comes from design, 
production, marketing and the rest of the myriad of activities that contribute to the making of 
things.”). 
 79  See Scherer, supra note 48, at 441. 
 80  See Macdonald, supra note 76, at 24. 
 81  See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
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debate, and assumes for the purpose of discussion that the patent system 
should aim to compensate both invention and innovation costs.  With this 
assumption established, invention and innovation will continue to be used 
interchangeably in this Article.  Their more precise usage will be employed 
where necessary. 
Some commentators have posited that the definition of innovation may 
be context-specific.  Keith Maskus observes that “[d]efining innovation is 
extremely difficult in the context of a developing country.  Many forms of 
adaptation, absorption, and even creative imitation can be legitimate 
manifestations of innovation.”82  In other words, there is no global standard 
of inventiveness.  What counts as an innovation depends on the existing 
state of technological development of the country.  A new method for 
producing a chemical may not be novel in a global sense, but it may be the 
first such implementation in a developing country.  In that case, this 
adaptation of the production method should qualify as an innovation in that 
country. 
Maskus’s observation also hints at a very important point that has been 
made by other commentators: adaptation may require sophisticated 
technological knowledge and technical know-how.
83
  Imitation is costly, in 
some cases even more so than the original inventive process.
84
  Even though 
imitation may be ridiculed by intellectual property advocates as piracy to be 
deterred at all costs, it is in fact a very important means for developing 
countries to acquire technological capacity.  For example, in the nineteenth 
century, the United States was known for its extensive copying of foreign-
patented technology, which allowed it to catch up with the global 
technological leader of the time, Great Britain.
85
  One may choose to call it 
innovation or imitation, the fact remains that such activity is crucial for 
developing countries to acquire technological capacity and catch up with 
industrialized economies.  The patent-antitrust interface has significant 
impact on imitation.  To the extent that facilitation of imitation will allow a 
developing country to acquire technological capacity, thereby accelerating 
 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (proposing a 
commercialization view of patent systems and emphasizing the importance of patent systems 
in providing incentives to commercialize invention); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (arguing that the main function of 
a patent system is to facilitate commercialization of inventions). 
 82  Maskus et al., supra note 75, at 325. 
 83  Mansfield et al., supra note 48, at 910. 
 84  See id. at 909–10; Levin et al., supra note 49, at 807–12 (showing that for one-seventh 
of the innovations surveyed in their study, imitation costs were no smaller than the 
development costs by the original inventor). 
 85  See generally Ove Granstrand, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 29, at 266, 284; Scherer, supra note 18, at 
1140. 
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economic growth, antitrust law should facilitate it. 
2.  Incentive to Innovate 
Another important term to define is the incentive to innovate, which 
has been used repeatedly in this Article.  Professor Richard Gilbert defines 
the incentive to innovate as “the difference in profit that a firm can earn if it 
invests in research and development compared to what it would earn if it 
did not invest.”86  This incentive is determined by a number of factors, 
including “the characteristics of the invention, the strength of intellectual 
property protection, the extent of competition before and after innovation, 
barriers to entry in production and R&D, and the dynamics of R&D.”87 
3.  Technological Regime 
The last set of terms to be defined describes the conditions of a 
particular industry that determine the importance of patent protection to 
innovation.  The first concept to be introduced is known as a technological 
regime, which refers to the general technological environment of an 
industry as it pertains to innovation.  In particular, a technological regime 
can be broken down into two components: technological opportunity and 
appropriability conditions.
88
  Technological opportunities “reflect the 
likelihood of innovating for any given amount of money invested in 
(re)search.”89  They refer to the ease with which innovations can be found 
in a particular industry, or the potential for innovation.  Professor F.M. 
Scherer, one of the leading experts on innovation, further elucidates the 
concept as follows: “Technological opportunity in this context could relate 
partly to industry traditions or to demand conditions not manifested in mere 
sales volume, but it seems most likely to be associated with dynamic supply 
conditions dependent in turn upon the broad advance of scientific and 
technological knowledge.”90  Industries with close ties to traditional, basic 
scientific research, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, are replete with 
technological opportunities.
91
  Other industries, such as paper, food 
products, textile, and clothing, have fewer technological opportunities.
92
  
The abundance of technological opportunities in a particular industry is 
exogenous to patent policy and the patent-antitrust interface.  It is 
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determined by the nature of the industry and the technologies it employs.  
The patent-antitrust interface thus takes this dimension of a technological 
regime as given. 
Appropriability refers to the conditions of an industry that allow the 
inventor to reap the economic benefits of its invention and to recoup its 
investment in it.  Appropriability “summarizes the possibilities of 
protecting innovations from imitation and of reaping profits from 
innovative activities.  High appropriability means the existence of ways of 
successfully protecting innovation from imitation.  Low appropriability 
conditions denote an economic environment characterized by widespread 
existence of externalities.”93  Appropriability is high when imitation is 
technically difficult (as in the case of complex machinery), costly, or when 
effective mechanisms are available to the patentee to prevent or minimize 
imitation.  Otherwise, appropriability is likely to be low and the inventor 
will face considerable difficulty in reaping the benefits of its invention.  
Appropriability also depends on the accessibility and cumulativeness of 
knowledge.
94
  If knowledge within the industry is easily accessible, 
appropriability is likely to be low.  If knowledge is cumulative, competitors 
may have difficulty in replicating the inventor’s technology without access 
to its knowledge base.  Appropriability is thus likely to be high.  Unlike 
technological opportunities, appropriability is endogenous to the patent 
system and the patent-antitrust interface.  Changes in patent law and 
antitrust restrictions of patent exploitation affect an inventor’s ability to 
reap rewards from its invention. 
The concept of cumulativeness of knowledge refers to the fact that 
“today’s innovations and innovative activities form the starting point for 
tomorrow’s innovations.  More broadly, one may say that high 
cumulativeness means that today’s innovative firms are more likely to 
innovate in the future in specific technologies and along specific trajectories 
than non-innovative firms.”95  Cumulativeness highlights the fact that 
technological development does not start on a blank page.  Every invention 
builds on prior knowledge or ideas.
96
  Cumulativeness does not only apply 
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to firms, but also at the country level.
97
  Today’s innovative nations are 
more likely than the technological laggards to continue to innovate.  The 
result is path dependency in innovation for developing countries.  Absent 
dramatic changes, developing countries are likely to remain on the low-
technology path of development. 
There are many reasons for this.  An important one, at least as it 
pertains to the character of knowledge, is the relative lack of access to tacit 
knowledge for developing countries.  Tacit knowledge, or technical know-
how, tends to diffuse through more informal means.  However, tacit 
knowledge is crucial to a firm’s ability to utilize a new technology.98 
Because of the informal means by which it is transferred, tacit knowledge 
tends to circulate more freely within a domestic market than across national 
borders, even though barriers to transnational flow are eroding with 
globalization and advancement in communication technology.
99
  As such, 
even if developing country firms have access to a patented technology from 
foreign patent documents, their limited access to tacit knowledge 
substantially impairs their ability to implement it.  This brief discussion 
highlights the enormous obstacles facing developing countries in their effort 
to acquire technological capacity and catch up with industrialized 
economies. 
B.  Is Patent Protection Necessary for Securing Innovation? 
The basic economic rationale for patents is simple: “If there were no 
incentives for those who discover and develop new technology, it is likely 
that fewer innovations would be developed, slowing progress and the 
benefits it brings.”100  Innovation incentives are likely to be under-supplied 
because technology, embodied in the form of knowledge, possesses many 
characteristics of a public good.
101
  The consumption of technological 
knowledge is non-rivalrous, that is, one user’s consumption does not 
exclude others.  Moreover, technological knowledge is costly to produce 
but easy to imitate.  This means that without some form of legal 
intervention, there will be an insufficient supply of technology.  This is 
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where patents come in.  Patents improve the appropriability of technology 
by allowing an inventor to exclude others from replicating, implementing, 
or commercializing the technology.  Patents are said to serve three 
objectives: promote inventions, spur the development and commercial 
utilization of inventions, and encourage inventors to disclose their 
inventions to the public.
102
  Discussions about the objectives of patent 
systems tend to focus on the first two; it is often easy to overlook the 
third.
103
  This objective is important because in the implicit bargain between 
the patent system and inventors is the grant of limited exclusivity in 
exchange for the disclosure of knowledge that will benefit society.  
Moreover, as discussed earlier, patent disclosure plays a role in the 
dissemination of technical knowledge and R&D spillovers. 
One striking feature of the discourse about the patent system is the 
incongruity between the general perception about the system and academic 
opinions among economists.  While it is almost an article of faith within 
antitrust circles that patent protection is needed to secure innovations, 
economists have long expressed considerable reservations about, if not 
outright hostility toward, patents.
104
  Professor Fritz Machlup, a pioneer in 
innovation economics, famously opined: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to 
recommend instituting one.  But since we have had a patent system 
for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
105
 
This observation was made in 1958.  Despite half a century of further 
research, this skepticism about the patent system has not been dispelled. 
Sharing this ambivalent attitude, Scherer asserts: “It is almost 
impossible to conceive of any existing social institutions so faulty in many 
ways.  It survives only because there seems to be nothing better.”106  He 
believes the strongest justification for the patent system is to secure the kind 
of rare, groundbreaking inventions that redound a disproportionately great 
amount of benefits to society.
107
  An example is the photocopying 
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technology invented by physicist Chester Carlson and commercialized by 
The Haloid Corporation, which was subsequently renamed Xerox.
108
  
Xerography, as the technology is officially known, is generally regarded as 
a technology that would not have been successfully commercialized without 
patent protection.
109
  Professor Sol Piciotto similarly notes that economists 
“have therefore always had difficulty finding adequate justification for 
these exclusive rights.”110  Even more critically, Professors Michele Boldrin 
and David Levine have recently argued that intellectual property, including 
patents, is better called intellectual monopoly and should be abolished.
111
  




What follows is an overview of the theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence that shows how the case for the necessity of patent 
protection to spur innovation has been overstated.  From a theoretical 
perspective, whether patent protection is necessary to reward inventors 
depends on the appropriability conditions of the industry at issue, i.e., 
whether there are other means that allow the inventor to reap the benefits of 
its invention without resorting to patent protection.  As it turns out, 
economists have shown through empirical studies that inventors in many 
industries do not rely on patent protection as their primary means of 
investment recoupment.  There is evidence from both developed and 
developing countries that support this conclusion. 
1.  Theoretical Analysis of the Need for Patent Protection to Spur 
Innovation 
Patent protection is not always necessary for securing innovation.  
Conditions in an industry may be such that financial rewards are sufficient 
absent patent protections to incentivize innovation.  The abundance of 
accessible technological opportunities lowers innovation costs, the 
consequence of which is that firms may pursue innovation without the 
financial reward provided by the patent system.
113
  This abundance may be 
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attributted to the wealth of basic scientific research funded by the public 
bodies or the nature of the industry.  Similarly, if innovations can be 
discovered relatively easily in the normal production process—this is 
particularly relevant for process innovations—firms are again unlikely to 
require innovation incentives supplied by the patent system. 
Second, and more importantly, appropriability may be naturally high 
in a particular industry due to its competitive structure or the nature of the 
technology. Appropriability crucially depends on the likelihood of 
imitation.  If no imitation comes into the market after a new product is 
invented and commercialized, the inventor’s chance of successful 
recoupment of their investment is maximized.
114
  If imitation will happen 
eventually, which is the case for most inventions, the key to appropriability 
is the length of the imitation lag.
115
 
From a potential imitator’s perspective, the decision to imitate or not 
comes down to whether the profit from imitation outweighs its costs.  The 
two key determinants are hence the profit potential of imitation and 
imitation costs.
116
  The profit from imitation depends on a variety of factors, 
such as the profit potential (quasi-rent) of the invention and the number of 
potential imitators.  The profit potential of an invention in turn depends on 
the demand for the product incorporating the technology.  This is where the 
nature of the technology comes into play.  An invention that is unique or a 
significant improvement of existing technology will likely attract strong 
demand and generate significant profit potential.  The profit potential for a 
minor improvement of an existing technology is likely to be smaller.  The 
number of potential imitators also bears on the profit potential of imitation.  
The existence of a large number of potential imitators means that they will 
likely drive down the price of the imitated product, perhaps to even as low 
as marginal costs.  Profit potential also depends on the inventor’s pricing 
strategy.  An inventor that charges a high price will reap greater profit, but 
will also attract market entrants sooner and in greater numbers. In sum, 
other things being equal, the higher the profit potential for an invention, the 
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Imitation costs mainly depend on two factors: the ease of imitation and 
the amount of investments required to undertake the imitation, which is 
driven by the first factor.
118
  Other things being equal, the more difficult it is 
to imitate a technology, the more costly the imitation process.  Ease of 
imitation in turns depends on a variety of factors.  Economists speak of the 
codifiability of a technology, which refers to the extent to which a 
technology can be accurately and comprehensively reduced to written 
form.
119
  A technology that is easily codified, which characterizes most 
inventions in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, is more easily 
imitated.
120
  A potential imitator merely needs to pick up a blueprint or a 
patent application to replicate the technology.  Codifiability is related to 
tacit knowledge.  An invention that requires substantial tacit knowledge to 
be implemented suffers from low codifiability and is difficult to imitate.
121
  
Tacit knowledge is by definition not readily codifiable.  Ease of imitation 
lowers imitation costs and appropriability. 
Imitation costs also depend on the complexity of the technology and 
the number of related investments—such as construction of production 
facilities and personnel training—that a firm must make to replicate the 
technology.
122
  A firm may be able to reproduce an imitated technology in 
its existing manufacturing facility.  In that case, imitation costs are likely to 
be low.  Some new technology requires a reconfiguration of the existing 
manufacturing facility or even the construction of a new plant.  The 
semiconductor industry is a prime example of this.
123
  It is not uncommon 
for a new generation of semiconductor chips to require brand new 
foundries.
124
  Imitation costs in such an industry are likely to be high.  Even 
if a competitor manages to get a hold of the latest design blueprint for an 
Intel chip, it may still need to expend substantial resources to convert its 
manufacturing facility for the new product. 
Imitation is not the only determinant of appropriability.  
Appropriability also depends on the profitability of the invention prior to or 
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in spite of imitation.
125
  High profit potential of an invention can be both a 
curse and a blessing as far as appropriability is concerned.  As mentioned 
previously, high profit margin attracts imitators, which will undercut the 
inventor’s profit.  High profit margin is also what usually attracts the 
inventor to invest in the invention in the first place.  Profit potential varies 
with the competitive structure of an industry.  A perfectly competitive 
market will require patent protection or some other kind of incentive 
mechanism to secure innovations, as the price of the product will be driven 
by competition to its marginal cost.
126
  In contrast, a market that is 
oligopolistic or otherwise protected by substantial barriers to entry will 
allow the firms to make use of their market power to charge supra-
competitive prices, thereby recouping their investments.
127
  An oligopolistic 
market will also have fewer potential imitators, which helps to preserve the 
inventor’s profit.128 
Appropriability is preserved if an inventor can recoup its investment 
before imitated products come into the market.  The pertinent issue is the 
time it takes for successful imitation to take place—referred to as imitation 
lag.
129
  Even if a technology can be effectively imitated, it often entails 
substantial time lag.  Secrecy, imperfect information about the technology, 
and the amount of tacit knowledge associated with the deployment of the 
technology all contribute to it.
130
  Imitation lag is important, because it 
gives the inventor time to reap the benefits of its invention before its supra-
competitive profit is competed away by imitation.  This is known as the 
first-mover advantage in the literature, and has been found to be an 
important, if not the overriding, source of innovation incentives in some 
industries.
131
  The first-mover advantage can be further augmented by brand 
loyalty, which allows an inventor to continue to charge a supra-competitive 
price after entry of imitated products.
132
 
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that patent protection 
is only needed to spur innovation if technological opportunities are sparse 
and appropriability is low in a particular industry.  In particular, 
appropriability will be low if the technology at issue is easy to imitate, 
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costly to develop, takes a short time to imitate, requires little tacit 
knowledge or few other substantial investments to implement, and is not 
particularly unique or economically valuable.
133
  Appropriability will also 
be low if the market at issue is competitive and full of potential imitators, 
has low barriers to entry, and is characterized by low brand loyalty, which 
will undermine first-mover advantage.  On the relationship between market 
structure and innovation incentives, Professor Gilbert notes that 
“[e]xclusive rights generally lead to greater innovation incentives in more 
competitive markets, while nonexclusive rights generally lead to the 
opposite conclusion, although there are important exceptions.”134  Patent 
protection is hence less vital to innovation in less competitive industries.  
Where appropriabilty is low, legal intervention, in the form of patent 
protection or otherwise, may be needed to augment returns to technological 
investment.  However, where appropriability is already high in a particular 
industry, patent protection is much less essential.  If inventions in that 
industry will continue to be made even without patent protection, a patent 
system redounds few benefits to society while inflicting substantial costs in 
the form of consumer welfare loss. 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals are industries that are marked by low 
appropriability.  Studies have repeatedly shown that these two industries 
stand out in their reliance on patent protection to spur innovation.
135
  This is 
hardly surprising given the fact that technology in both industries tends to 
be relatively codifiable, does not require substantial tacit knowledge to 
implement, is easy to imitate, and requires high R&D investment.
136
  This 
means that both imitation costs and time lag are low.  The profit potential, 
however, is substantial for most chemical and pharmaceutical inventions, 
especially the latter, because demand for medications tends to be inelastic 
and market structure for the industry highly concentrated.
137
  This means 
that imitation is highly profitable.  It is this somewhat unusual alignment of 
circumstances that renders both industries so dependent on patent protection 
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  What is unfortunate is that these two industries, 
especially the pharmaceutical industry, have often been held out as the 
paradigm for innovation and used to justify patent protection.  The fact of 
the matter is that they are the exceptions rather than the rule.
139
  As the 
ensuing discussion of the empirical literature will show, these two 
industries are outliers in terms of their dependence on patent protection.  
For most other industries, patent protection is much less important. 
What is doubly unfortunate is that the pharmaceutical industry, in 
particular, has hijacked patent policy both in the United States and globally.  
It has been relentless in its drive for expansion of patent protection in the 
United States, and was instrumental in the ultimate success of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which enlarged patent rights at the expense of developing 
country consumers.
140
  By some accounts, the push to incorporate 
intellectual property issues on the then-GATT agenda came in no small part 
from the pharmaceutical industry.
141
  It put enormous pressure on the U.S. 
government to force India and Brazil to abandon its opposition to 
pharmaceutical patents, which neither country had granted prior to 
TRIPS.
142
  It even strenuously lobbied for a prohibition of parallel trade in 
the Agreement.
143
  In the late-1990s, it lobbied the U.S. government to force 
the South African government, under the threat of trade sanctions, to drop a 
proposed law that would allow compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals, 




Further exploration of the role of the pharmaceutical industry in the 
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global expansion of patent rights is beyond the scope of this Article.
145
  The 
fact remains, however, that in light of the foregoing discussion, developing 
country antitrust authorities should have reservations about claims of 
essentiality of patent protection for innovation and be ready to examine the 
technological regime, and in particular the appropriability conditions, of the 
underlying industry to verify those claims. 
2.  Empirical Evidence on the Need for Patent Protection to Spur 
Innovation 
Economics is replete with empirical studies indicating the industry 
variation of the importance of patent protection to innovation.  The first 
systematic study of this issue was conducted in the United Kingdom.  Using 
data from twenty-seven firms, Professors Taylor and Silberston found that 
64% of pharmaceutical R&D, 17% of chemical R&D, 5% of mechanical 
engineering R&D, and a negligible amount of electrical engineering R&D 
were dependent on patent protection.
146
  This result was subsequently 
confirmed by a number of major studies on the relationship between patent 
protection and innovation.  In 1981, Professor Edwin Mansfield and his co-
authors published the results of a study of the imitation time and costs in 
chemical, drug, electronics, and machinery industries for forty-eight 
product innovations.
147
  They found that 36% of the R&D expenditure by 
the surveyed firms would not have been made without patent protection.
148
  
Furthermore, innovating firms report that about 50% of the innovations in 
the sample would not have been introduced absent patent protection, with 
the bulk belonging to the pharmaceutical industry.
149
  Leaving out 
innovations from that industry, the corresponding proportion falls to less 
than one-quarter.
150
  All in all, they found that 90% of pharmaceutical 
innovations and about 20% of chemical, electronics, and machinery 
innovations are dependent on patent protection.
151
 
Mansfield subsequently conducted another survey with an expanded 
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lamentable fact, however, is that one industry has hijacked patent policy not only in the 
United States but also across the globe.  One must wonder—given the apparent inability of 
politicians, especially those in the United States, to resist the intense lobbying from the 
industry over patent policy—whether the patent system would be better off if a separate 
system was created for the protection of pharmaceutical inventions. 
 146  TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 135, at 199. 
 147  Mansfield et al., supra note 48, at 907. 
 148  Id. at 915. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Mansfield, supra note 135, at 174. 
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scope, covering one hundred firms in twelve industries.
152
  The survey 
produced results largely consistent with his 1981 study.  He found that 
patent protection was only deemed to be important for the development and 
commercialization of over 30% of the innovations in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries, and for 10% to 20% of the innovations in 
petroleum, machinery, and fabricated metal products.
153
  Patent protection 
was of limited value in electrical equipment, office equipment, motor 
vehicles, instruments, primary metals, rubber, and textiles.
154
  These survey 
results led Mansfield to conclude that “[d]espite the fact that the patent 
system generally is defended at least partly on the grounds that it increases 
the rate of innovation, the present study indicates that its effects in this 
regard are very small in most of the industries we studied.”155 
In one of the most authoritative studies on the topic, Levin and his 
colleagues at Yale conducted an extensive study of the appropriability 
conditions in more than one hundred manufacturing industries.  This 
survey, which consisted of a survey of high-level R&D executives, has 
sometimes been referred to as the “Yale survey.”156  Levin and his 
colleagues reached a number of important conclusions.  First, they 
concluded that the importance of patent protection varies with the type of 
innovation at issue.  Patent protection was found to have a more significant 
effect on the appropriability conditions for product innovations than those 
for process innovations.
157
  For process innovations, patents were generally 
rated as the least effective appropriabilty mechanism.
158
  Lead time, 
learning curve advantages, and secrecy were all reported to be more 
effective.
159
  For product innovations, patents were more effective than 
secrecy but substantially less so than lead time, learning curve advantages, 
and sales efforts.
160
  Focusing on the eighteen most heavily sampled 
industries, they were able to establish “the limited effectiveness of patents 
as a means of appropriation . . . . In only one industry, drugs, were product 
patents regarded by a majority of respondents as strictly more effective than 
other means of appropriation.”161  Patents were somewhat important in only 
 
 152  Id. at 173 
 153  Id. at 174.  These results were compiled based on estimates provided by leading R&D 
executives from a random sample of 100 U.S. manufacturing firms. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. at 180. 
 156  Levin et al., supra note 49, at 788–93. 
 157  Id. at 794–95. 
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. at 795 (noting that 80% of the sample businesses rated the effectiveness of sales 
and service at 5.0 on a scale of 7 while only 20% of the sample businesses rated patents as 
this effective). 
 161  Id. at 796. 
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Similar results were obtained in studies conducted in other 
industrialized economies.  In a study of Swiss firms published in 1995, 
Harabi found that lead time and related advantages in manufacturing and 
marketing presented the most important appropriation mechanism and 
patent the least important mechanism.
163
  In an exhaustive comparative 
study that accounted for 50% and 90% of R&D spending in Japan and 
Sweden respectively, Professor Ove Grandstrand found that patents were by 
and large the least important appropriation mechanism for Swedish firms, 
and that marketing and lead time were more important.
164
  Lastly, in an 
international expansion of the Yale survey, Professor Wesley Cohen and his 
colleagues at Carnegie Mellon concluded that there are substantial nation- 
and sector-specific differences in the use of patents, secrecy, lead times, and 
other means for appropriation of the returns from innovation.
165
  
Specifically, their results confirmed those from the Yale survey that patent 
protection was not the most important appropriation mechanism for U.S. 
firms.
166
  Lead time and secrecy were.
167
 
Apart from the basic message that patent protection is not essential for 
securing innovation in most industries, the foregoing empirical studies also 
produced other interesting findings that may have important implications 
for the patent-antitrust interface in developing countries.  First, the widely 
held belief among economists that patent protection is more important for 
small firms than for large ones is not substantiated.
168
  In fact, Mansfield 
concluded patent protection is equally important for small and big firms in 
his survey, which is consistent with the results from a number of surveys in 
the U.K.
169
  Economists have long believed that because small firms may 
lack the financial means or experience to commercialize an invention, they 
will need to rely on licensing mechanisms to transfer their inventions to 
larger firms.
170
  Such licensing would only be possible if the invention was 
 
 162  Id. at 796–97 (finding that most respondents in these three industries rated patents as 
no less effective than the best alternative). 
 163  Najib Harabi, Appropriability of Technical Innovations: An Empirical Analysis, 24 
RES. POL’Y 981, 984 (1995). 
 164  OVE GRANSTRAND, THE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
168 (1999). 
 165  Wesley Cohen et al., R&D Information Flows and Patenting in Japan and the United 
States, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 130–33 (Ove Granstrand ed., 
2003). 
 166  Id. at 134–47. 
 167  Id. at 132. 
 168  Mansfield, supra note 135, at 175. 
 169  Id.; Mansfield et al., supra note 48, at 916; Macdonald, supra note 76, at 17–19. 
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somehow propertized and capable of transfer for value, which the patent 
system facilitates.  The finding that patents are no more important for small 
firms than for large ones is significant, because as one may recall, 
achievement of broader development goals requires antitrust to pay 
attention to the welfare of small- and medium-sized enterprises.  To the 
extent that patents were more valuable to small firms, and that small firms 
in developing countries produce patentable innovations, there would be a 
persuasive reason for developing countries to favor patent policy.  That, 
however, turns out not to be the case. 
Second, again contrary to common belief, patents do not completely 
eliminate imitation, but merely raise imitation costs.  Mansfield and his co-
authors discovered that despite patent protection, 60% of the surveyed 
innovations were imitated within four years of their introduction.
171
  In fact, 
for about half of the innovations, the firms felt that patent protection only 
delayed entry by a few months.
172
  Patent protection increases imitation 
costs by 30% in the pharmaceutical industry, 10% in chemicals, and 7% in 
electronics and machinery.
173
  The Yale survey produced similar results, 
concluding that patents did not prevent imitations, but instead raised 
imitation costs by 40% for pharmaceuticals, 25% to 30% for chemicals, and 
7% to 15% in electronics.
174
  Furthermore, the ability legally to invent 
around a patented innovation was cited in the study as a major limitation on 
the effectiveness of patent protection.
175
  Gilbert suggests that even in the 
pharmaceutical industry, where patents are crucial, patent protection does 
not preempt rivals’ efforts to invent around the patent or produce a similar 
product.
176
  In fact, he noted that discovery of a new drug by one firm 




The fact that patent protection does not forestall inventing around or 
imitation is important because it means that the causal link between patent 
protection and reward for innovation becomes more complex and tenuous.  
 
New Technology-Based Firms, 33 RES. POL’Y 1141, 1141 (2004). 
 171  Mansfield et al., supra note 48, at 913. 
 172  Id. at 916. 
 173  Id. at 913. 
 174  Levin et al., supra note 49, at 811. 
 175  Id. at 802–03. 
 176  Gilbert, supra note 35, at 202. 
 177  Id.  Cockburn and Henderson suggest that there is substantial positive knowledge 
spillover in the pharmaceutical industry, and that discoveries by one firm tend to improve 
technological opportunities for other firms.  For example, they observe that nine different 
pharmaceutical companies patented ACE-inhibitor drugs in the eight years after Squibb 
patented the first drug in this category in 1977.  Ian Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Racing 
to Invest? The Dynamics of Competition in Ethical Drug Discovery, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
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One can no longer assume, as many economists tend to do in their 
theoretical models, that patent protection generates financial reward for the 
patentees.
178
  This will be particularly relevant when assessing the consumer 
harm afflicted by a patent exploitation practice.  To the extent that patent 
protection inflicts consumer welfare loss without creating corresponding 
innovation incentives, developing country antitrust authorities need to be 
particularly cautious about patent exploitation practices that raise prices on 
consumers. 
Third, the information diffusion function of patent disclosure is much 
less prominent than has been assumed.  It was said earlier that patents 
perform an important information diffusion function by allowing rivals to 
learn about a new technology from patent disclosure.
179
  It turns out that the 
value of this disclosure has been overstated.  Taylor and Silberston 
estimated that patent information only saves firms 0.75% of their R&D 
expenditure, a saving which they call “infinitesimal.”180  Other authors have 
confirmed the insignificant contribution of patents to information diffusion 
as well.
181
  Attempts to justify patent protection on the grounds of 
information diffusion are suspect. 
3.  Evidence from Developing Countries on the Need for Patent Protection 
to Spur Innovation 
All of the empirical studies cited in the previous subpart were 
conducted in developed countries.  Since the question is whether patent 
protection spurs innovation in developing countries, studies done in these 
countries would be preferable.  Unfortunately, comparable surveys in 
developing countries are rare.  But all hope is not lost as there are 
alternative types of evidence available. 
One of the silver linings of the adoption of TRIPS is that it has 
 
 178  Where patent protections merely increase imitation costs, as opposed to completely 
excluding rivals, the impact of patent protection on consumer welfare would partly depend 
on the state of competition in the industry after rivals have successfully imitated the patented 
technology.  In this scenario, patent protection merely becomes a tool for the patentee to 
raise costs of production for rivals.  The magnitude of this increase provides a cushion to the 
patentee and gives it room to raise its prices as well.  In that sense, the monopoly markup on 
the patented product will to some extent depend on the magnitude of increase in imitation 
costs.  Likewise, the ease of inventing around will affect the patentee’s ability to extract a 
monopoly price for the patented product, and hence, affect the patentee’s ability to generate 
the patentee reward.  This may be a less important issue in industries in which patent 
protection is not the main impetus for innovation.  But for industries in which patent 
protection provides the main motivation for innovation, easy inventing around will 
undermine the patentee’s ability to obtain the requisite patentee reward. 
 179  See supra Part IV.B. 
 180  TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 135, at 212. 
 181  Macdonald, supra note 76, at 15–16; Jacob Schmookler, Investors Past and Present, 
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provided a number of natural experiments on the relationship between 
patent protection and innovation in developing countries.  A great many 
developing countries, such as India, Brazil, and Argentina, did not grant 
product patents for pharmaceuticals prior to TRIPS, but were compelled to 
amend their patent laws after the TRIPS Agreement came into effect.
182
  
One can gauge the incentive effects of patent protection by observing 
whether there was a substantial increase in pharmaceutical innovation after 
the TRIPS-required reforms were put in place. 
Pharmaceutical R&D expenditure did not experience any significant 
increase in any of the developed countries surveyed by economists 
following the TRIPS Agreement.  Based on a number of economic studies 
from Lebanon, South Korea, and Argentina, Maskus concluded that 
pharmaceutical R&D in those countries was not expected to increase after 
patent protection was introduced.
183
  Nogues conducted a detailed study of 
the Argentine pharmaceutical industry, and similarly “found no reason to 
expect an increase in domestic R&D in pharmaceuticals due to recognition 
of product patents.”184  This is because “the development of new chemical 
entities is outside the reach of local companies in any developing country, 
since there are no firms in such countries big enough (in terms of total 
sales) to finance the high costs of pharmaceutical R&D.”185  Maskus shares 
a similar view, asserting that “[f]ew, if any, firms in developing countries 
are likely to find it attractive to engage in fundamental R&D in competition 
with the major international research-based pharmaceutical companies, 
which have expertise in research and marketing and benefit from significant 
economies of scale.”186 
Another natural experiment can be found in Italy,
187
 which had not 
granted patent protection to pharmaceuticals prior to 1978, when the Italian 
Constitutional Court held that the denial of patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals was unconstitutional.
188
  Up until then, Italy had boasted a 
 
 182  Pharmaceutical patents and the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE  ORG. n.2 (Sept. 
21, 2006), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharma_ato186_e.htm (listing 
Argentina, Brazil, and India as coutries that had to adopt pharmaceutical patenting laws to 
comply with their TRIPS obligations). 
 183  MASKUS, supra note 48, at 165. 
 184  CORREA, supra note 70, at 43 (citing Julio Nogues, Patents and Pharmaceutical 
Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on Developing Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE L. 81 
(1990)). 
 185  Id. 
 186  MASKUS, supra note 48, at 220. 
 187  The Italian experience is relevant even though Italy is not a developing country, 
because the innovative capacity of its pharmaceutical industry circa 1978 is not significantly 
different from that of today’s Indian and Brazilian pharmaceutical industries. 
 188  Scherer & Weisburst, supra note 137, at 1009; see also BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra 
note 74, at  245. 
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vibrant generic pharmaceutical sector.
189
  In response to the Court’s 
decision, the Italian Parliament amended the patent law to include 
pharmaceuticals.
190
  Again, if pharmaceutical innovation boomed after the 
amendment, one may conclude that patent protection does spur innovation. 
Scherer found that after pharmaceutical patents became available in 
Italy, there was no significant increase in pharmaceutical R&D expenditures 
relative to world trends, no significant increase in the number of new drug 
entities introduced by Italian firms, and a sharp deterioration of the Italian 
balance of trade in drugs.
191
  Export sales plummeted and multinational 
firms began to import many of their products into Italy from other European 
countries.
192
  The domestic pharmaceutical firms were gradually taken over 
by multinational firms,
193
 and generic production capacity moved from Italy 
to India.
194
  Most tellingly, there was no emergence of significant domestic 
innovators in the industry.  In short, the supposed dynamic efficiency 
benefits of patent protection did not materialize in Italy, just like in many 
developing countries following TRIPS.  The results of these natural 
experiments are particularly persuasive evidence on the relationship 
between patent protection and innovation because pharmaceuticals, at least 
in developed countries, are heavily reliant on patent protection.  Therefore, 
one would expect the introduction of pharmaceutical patents to have a 
pronounced incentive effect. 
The experiences recounted here reveal an important reality about 
innovation in developing countries: in some industries, innovation may be 
so technically complex or resource-intensive that developing countries 
simply do not have the capacity to innovate and compete globally.  
Moreover, even if innovation may be less technologically or financially 
demanding, the domestic industry may be so far behind the international 
technological frontier that innovation is again currently unattainable.  In 
light of these arguments, Professor Carlos Correa has concluded that: 
With the exception of a few developing countries which have been 
able to build up a reasonable R&D infrastructure (such as the East 
 
 189  Scherer & Weisburst, supra note 137, at 1009. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Id. at 1020–23.  Although some have noted that the lack of innovation in Italy may be 
due to other intervening factors, such as stringent price controls.  Cynthia M. Ho, Patent 
Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371, 454 n.409 (2009). 
 192  Scherer & Weisburst, supra note 137, at 1022.  Scherer and Weisburst did not reach a 
definitive conclusion on why this happened.  Their conjecture was that “importers become 
more competitive in Italy after gaining patent protection, while Italian manufacturers, unable 
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Asian “Tigers,” India and Brazil), most developing countries are 
unlikely to substantially improve their innovative performance just 




As many industries in developing countries simply have no inventors 
who can take advantage of the innovation incentives generated by the patent 
system, the costs of a pro-patent policy are incurred in vain.  This is 
consistent with Stewart’s criticism of Jamaica’s decision to exempt 
agreements related to intellectual property from the purview of antitrust 
law: “Yet, there is little or no innovation requiring conferring of industry 
property rights on locals, and there is ample historical evidence of firms 
using monopoly power derived from intellectual property rights to create 
barriers to entry by other [sic] or to divide up markets geographically.”196  
Many of the least-developed countries are likely to be similar to Jamaica in 
their lack of innovative capacity.
197
  These countries should not aim to 
develop innovative capacity, but to acquire imitative capacity.
198
 
While developing countries are capable of producing innovations, 
economists  have observed that developing countries tend to see more of the 
process kind of innovations instead of the product kind.
199
  It has been noted 
that it was through process innovations that the United States and Germany 
caught up with the U.K. in the nineteenth century, and that Japan did the 
same with the United States after the Second World War.
200
  These process 
innovations are described as those “of the organizational type[,] that 
allowed for simultaneous exploitation of scale economies and flexibility, 
leading to high through-put, efficient inventory management, high 
quality/reliability, and a proven ability to adjust to the needs of the end-
user.”201  An example is the kanban, or just-in-time, manufacturing system 
developed by the Japanese automobile industry to increase responsiveness 
 
 195  CORREA, supra note 70, at 38. 
 196  TAIMOON STEWART, JULIAN CLARKE & SUSAN JOEKES, COMPETITION LAW IN ACTION: 
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 198  See discussion infra Part VI.C. 
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to changes in consumer demand and to reduce inventory.
202
  The success of 
the Japanese automobile industry—especially Toyota, which originated the 
system—is too familiar to warrant repetition here.203  At this juncture, one 
may recall a finding from the Yale survey that patent protection is the least 
important appropriation mechanism for process innovations, which are 
difficult for competitors to discover and understand merely from the final 
product, and can be effectively protected through trade secret laws.  This 
means that developing countries have a weaker need to extend patent 
protection to induce innovations, which are mostly of the process kind. 
Another fact in support of the relative dispensability of patent 
protection in developing countries is that most innovations originating from 
those countries are likely to be incremental or adaptive.  For example, the 
Brazilian agricultural machinery industry is known for its successful 
adaptations of foreign machines to the domestic environment that have 
allowed it to dominate the Brazilian market.
204
  Most innovations from 
developing countries are not patentable, because they are not novel or non-
obvious enough to meet patentability standards.
205
  Providing patent 
protection will not create incentives for these incremental innovations, but 
will impose significant costs in terms of consumer welfare loss.  A pro-
patent stance in the patent-antitrust interface will have little impact on these 
incremental innovations. 
In conclusion, there is scant evidence that the extension of patent 
protection in developing countries will lead to increased innovation.  When 
evaluating innovation-based claims in patent-antitrust cases, a developing 
country antitrust authority must be mindful of the limitations of the 
country’s innovative capacity.  No developing country would want to repeat 
Jamaica’s mistakes.  In particular, the authority should consider whether 
there is any innovative capacity in a particular industry, and if so, what kind 
of innovation it is capable of producing, product or process, novel or 
incremental. 
C.  Developing Countries Should Not Weigh Innovation Incentive 
Externalities in the Patent-Antitrust Interface 
With the advent of globalization, the innovation incentives generated 
by a country’s patent system are no longer confined within its borders.  
With increased trade and the possibility of FDI, these incentives may be felt 
by foreign inventors as well.  Given that the market for many innovations is 
no longer domestic, a multinational inventor will consider the innovation 
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incentives provided by its various markets when making an investment 
decision.  In short, innovation incentives spill over national boundaries and 
can have substantial externalities.  When considering the impact of its 
decision in patent-antitrust cases, an antitrust authority may need to take 
these externalities into account. 
The question is whether a developing country antitrust authority 
should pay heed to innovation incentive externalities.  To formulate it 
slightly differently, the question is whether such an authority should 
consider the patentee reward accruing to foreign inventors when 
determining the legality of a patent exploitation practice.  For a small 
developing country, the answer would seem to be negative.  There are good 
reasons to doubt that a multinational firm will consider the innovation 
incentives provided by every market in which it operates.  The fact that 
most innovations are only patented in a limited number of jurisdictions 
attests to this.
206
  A multinational firm will focus on its large markets, 
including the industrialized economies and the large developing 
countries.
207
  For small developing countries, the profit potential from their 
domestic markets is so small that the technology investment decisions of 
multinational firms are unlikely to depend on it.
208
  Even if one were to 
aggregate the profit potential generated by these small developing countries, 
it is unlikely to exceed a few percent of the global profit for a multinational 
corporation.
209
  An invention that would have been abandoned with the loss 
of a few percent of profit potential is unlikely to be groundbreaking and a 
significant boost to global welfare.  As Scherer noted, one wonders how 
 
 206  See Jeffrey Atik & Hans H. Lidgard, Embracing Price Discrimination: TRIPS and the 
Suppression of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L., 1043, 1058 
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 207  Mark V. Pauly, Measures of Costs and Benefits for Drugs in Cost-Effectiveness 
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ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 212 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 
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 208  In the context of pharmaceutical patenting, Scherer observed:  
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much worse off society would be by foregoing such innovations.
210
 
In contrast, the innovation incentives generated by large developing 
countries may have a substantial impact on technological investments on a 
global scale.  This still does not mean that these countries should consider 
innovation incentive externalities in patent-antitrust cases.  The provision of 
innovation incentives entails welfare transfer from consumers to 
inventors.
211
  In the global context, this transfer flows from developing 
country consumers to multinational firms.
212
  Given the impoverished state 
of consumers in many developing countries, this tradeoff should not be 
lightly made.  A developing country antitrust authority cannot be faulted for 
giving priority to the welfare of its downtrodden domestic consumers.  If an 
innovation is of sufficient global importance, developing countries are right 
to wonder whether they should be the ones to provide additional incentives 
through their patent systems. 
Development economists have come up with a number of theoretical 
models that predict the effect of strengthening intellectual property 
protection in developing countries on innovation that originates from 
developed countries.  As far as innovation incentives are concerned, 
strengthening patent protection and tightening antitrust restrictions on 
patent exploitation have similar impacts.  Surprisingly, and perhaps 
somewhat counter-intuitively, these models consistently show that 
innovation in developed countries will fall after developing countries raise 
their intellectual property protection.
213
  Based on the international product 
cycle, Carmelo Parello constructed a model to study the impact of 
heightened intellectual property protection in developing countries on the 
rate of innovation in developed countries and the rate of imitation in 
developing countries.
214
  In the absence of FDI, Carmelo concludes that 
improved protection induces a short-run slowdown in the innovation rate in 
developed countries and impedes technology transfer by imitation.
215
  
Edwin Lai supplements Parello’s analysis by examining the effect of 
enhanced protection in developing countries on the rate of innovation in 
developed countries when the means of technology transfer comprises both 
imitation and FDI.
216
  When imitation is the only means of technology 
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transfer, Lai’s conclusions are similar to Parello’s.217  When technology 
transfer is accomplished through investment, Lai finds that both the rate of 
innovation and the rate of imitation rise in response to enhanced protection 
in developing countries.
218
  Although his analysis is slightly more 
complicated, Helpman reaches the same result under the assumptions of no 
FDI and low imitation rate.
219
  Lastly, a theoretical study by Glass and 
Saggi lends further support to the conclusions from Parello, Lai, and 
Helpman, positing that “if innovative firms expected slower loss of their 
technological advantages they could earn higher profits per innovation, 
reducing the need to engage in R&D.”220  In light of this considerable body 
of literature, there is even less reason for a developing country’s antitrust 
authority to consider innovation incentive externalities. 
There is one possible exception to the above line of argument, which 
concerns technologies that are only useful to developing countries.  A prime 
example is drugs for tropical diseases.  Multinational pharmaceutical 
companies consistently under-invest in the development of these drugs.
221
  
For these products, the innovation incentives developing countries provide 
will be critical.  Development economists, such as Yong Yang, have 
suggested that developing countries should cooperate to offer innovation 
incentives to developed country inventors by forming what he calls 
“cooperation coalitions.”222  Unfortunately, even with the aid of such 
coalitions, the prognosis is unpromising for developing countries.  Scherer 
concludes that the number of new drugs introduced must treble in order to 
compensate developing country consumers for the welfare loss they have 
suffered as a result of the introduction of pharmaceutical patenting under 
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in developing countries, causing the overall rate of innovation to drop. 
 218  Id. 
 219  Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights, 61 
ECONOMETRICA 1247, 1275 (1993). 
 220  Amy Glass & Kamal Saggi, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct 
Investment, 56 J. INT’L ECON. 387 (2002). 
 221  Scherer, supra note 18, at 1137–40. 
 222  Yong Yang, Why Do Southern Countries Have Little Incentive to Protect Northern 
Intellectual Property Rights?, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON. 800, 807–10 (1998).  Yang proposes 
that countries within these coalitions offer higher patent protection than those outside of the 
coalitions.  In fact, non-coalition developing countries are likely to lower their protection to 
free-ride on the effort of the coalition countries.  However, once the number of countries in 
these cooperation coalitions is large enough, developed country inventors will receive 
sufficient incentives to invest in technologies needed by developing countries. 
  





  Regrettably, he predicts that the number of new drugs would 
only grow by 15.5%.
224
  The price that these consumers need to pay for 
drugs that are uniquely demanded by them, that is, drugs for tropical 
diseases, is arguably too high.  Other policy interventions are necessary to 
incentivize research on these drugs.
225
 
To sum up, despite the spillover effects of innovation incentives from 
developing countries, the antitrust authorities in a vast majority of them 
would be doing their consumers a tremendous disservice by attaching 
undue weight to innovative incentives.  The exceptions may be large 
developing countries, such as India, China, and Brazil, whose markets are 
large enough that innovation incentive externalities from them may have 
significant impact on global innovation. 
D.  Rethinking the Relationship between Antitrust and Innovation 
Having explored the relationship between patent protection and 
innovation, it is important to turn our attention to the relationship between 
antitrust and innovation.  How exactly do the two relate to each other?  The 
conventional understanding is that antitrust rules affect innovation by 
altering the scope of patent exploitation, which in turn adjusts the patentee 
reward.
226
  Antitrust interacts with innovation incentives by adjusting the 
size of patentee reward through relaxing or tightening the scope of patent 
exploitation.  The more stringent the restrictions imposed by antitrust rules 
on patent exploitation, the smaller the patentee reward, and hence, the 
smaller the incentive to innovate.  For instance, the scope of patent 
exploitation can be tightened by prohibiting resale price maintenance of 
patented product, by prohibiting market allocation under a licensing 
agreement, or by prohibiting the imposition of post-expiration royalty in a 
licensing agreement.  These restrictions limit a patentee’s ability to 
maximize its financial return on its invention, and hence, reduce the size of 
its patentee reward.
227
  If there is a direct relationship between patentee 
reward and innovation incentives, then the stringency of antitrust rules on 
patent exploitation is inversely related to innovation incentives.
228
 
However, as the foregoing demonstrates, patentee reward is not 
necessary for generating innovation in many industries.  The appropriability 
conditions of these industries may be such that firms can recoup their R&D 
costs without resorting to patent protection. This weakens the inverse 
relationship between antitrust rules and innovation incentives and gives the 
 
 223  Scherer, supra note 18, at 1129. 
 224  Id. 
 225  Scherer & Weisburst, supra note 137, at 1140. 
 226  Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1823–24. 
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patent-antitrust interface greater leeway to focus on consumer welfare loss 
and other developmental considerations. 
E.  Summing Up 
The foregoing theoretical discussion and review of empirical studies 
firmly refutes the notion that patent protection is necessary for securing 
innovation.
229
  The extent to which innovation incentives rely on the patent 
system varies by industry.  In most industries, firms are spurred to innovate 
not by patentee reward, but by the need to secure a first-mover advantage.  
The costs and time lag of imitation allow first-movers to reap substantial 
profits before imitators enter the market.  Brand loyalty further reinforces 
this advantage.  Lead time also allows the innovating firm to improve the 
product before imitation appears. 
Empirical studies by a great number of eminent economists have 
repeatedly produced the same conclusion that patent protection is not the 
most important motivation for innovation.  First-mover advantage, learning 
curve advantages, and sales and marketing efforts are consistently rated as 
more significant in most industries.  The secondary role of patent protection 
for securing innovation is not unique to the United States; it is observed in 
other industrialized economies as well.  There are no doubt outliers in these 
studies.  The two most notable examples are pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals.  Outliers, however, should be treated as outliers, and should not 
be allowed to hijack the entire policy discussion.  As far as the patent-
antitrust interface is concerned, the dynamic efficiency gains of patent 
protection have been overstated. 
 
 229  The discussion thus far has focused on the question of whether increased patent 
protection will boost innovation, which in turn will hopefully promote economic growth.  
The relationship between patent protection and economic growth being investigated is an 
indirect one.  Some economists have attempted to determine the direct relationship between 
patent protection and economic growth.  Their results have largely been inconclusive.  Using 
a regression model, Gould and Gruben measured the significance of patent protection to 
growth prospects and found the coefficient for patent protection statistically insignificant.  
David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323 (1996).  Ginarte and Park conducted an elaborate 
study involving more sophisticated quantification of the strength of intellectual property 
rights.  Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Growth, 15 CONT. ECON. POL’Y 51 (1997).  They actually found a negative correlation 
between the strength of intellectual property protection and economic growth, although the 
correlation was again deemed to be statistically insignificant.  Finally, after an exhaustive 
review of empirical studies, Professors Bessen and Meurer conclude that “the empirical 
economic evidence strongly rejects simplistic arguments that patents universally spur 
innovation and economic growth.”  James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Do Parents 
Perform Like Property? 21 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 08-08, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103143.  In sum, the 
evidence showing that raising patent protection directly contributes to economic growth is 
ambiguous at best. 
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Developing countries should take care to scrutinize claims about 
innovation incentives. In addition, they should adopt an industry-based 
approach to the patent-antitrust interface.  There are industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, in which patent protection does promote 
innovation.  Dynamic efficiency considerations hence should be 
emphasized. For most other industries, however, the need to protect 
innovation incentives is accordingly weaker, and hence, antitrust in these 
industries should exhibit greater readiness to limit the scope of patent 
exploitation.  A reduction in the patentee reward in these industries is 
unlikely to have a significant impact on innovation incentives or to cause 
future innovations to deteriorate dramatically. 
V. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE PATENT-ANTITRUST 
INTERFACE 
Apart from promoting innovation, it has been said that patent 
protection induces technology transfer from developed country firms to 
developing countries.
230
  The underlying rationale is simple.  Multinational 
firms would only transfer technology to a developing country when they 
know that their technology is protected from imitation and they can reap the 
full benefits of their inventions.  Technology transfer redounds substantial 
benefit to developing countries.
231
  A developing country can improve its 
technological capacity in three main ways: domestic innovation (where 
possible), domestic imitation (or unintentional technology transfer by 
developed countries), and intentional technology transfer by developed 
country firms.  For developing countries that lack innovative capacity, 
technology transfer is one of the two main ways in which new technology 
can be acquired.
232
  For developing countries that lack even imitation 
capacity, technology transfer is the only means for technological 
progress.
233
  One may recall from the earlier discussion about economic 
growth that technological progress is a key to economic growth.  Therefore, 
technology transfer could be a major engine of growth in developing 
countries. 
Economists have identified three main ways in which technology is 
intentionally transferred: trade of technological goods,
234
 FDI, and 
 
 230  Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign 
Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 75, at 41, 60. 
 231  Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment 12 
(Univ. of Adelaide Ctr. for Int’l Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 0022, 2000), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=231122. 
 232  Lai, supra note 213, at 133–35. 
 233  Id. 
 234  Even though economists generally believe that trade of technological goods 
constitutes intentional technology transfer, their belief is only true in the sense that the 
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licensing.  In addition, there are three main ways in which technology is 
unintentionally transferred: unauthorized imitation,
235
 reverse engineering, 
and patent disclosure.
236
  When choosing between the various means of 
intentional transfer, a multinational firm considers a number of factors. 
Professor John Dunning has proposed the OLI paradigm for analyzing the 
decision-making process.
237
  OLI stands for the advantages of ownership, 
localization, and internalization.
238
  Ownership advantages—which include 
“technology and information, managerial, marketing and entrepreneurial 
skills, organisational systems, incentive structures, and favored access to 
intermediate or final goods markets”239—identify the competitive 
advantages of a multinational firm in the global market that will allow it to 
extend its reach to multiple markets.  Localization advantages—such as 
“the costs and quality of particular factor endowments, the size, character, 
and growth of domestic markets[,] and the policies of host government, for 
example, taxes and fiscal incentives”240—determine whether the firm will 
choose to produce the good in a foreign location and export it to the country 
at issue, or to locate production facilities in that country.  In other words, 
localization advantages explain the firm’s choice between trade on the one 
hand, and FDI or licensing on the other hand.  Internalization advantages 
are reasons “why a foreign firm prefers to retain full control over the 
production process instead of licensing its intangible assets to local 
firms.”241  The decision may be due to “high transaction costs involved in 
regulating and enforcing licensing contracts.”242  It may also be attributted 
 
technology has physically entered into the realm of the developing country.  For technology 
transfer to be meaningful, it must be conveyed to a producer that can replicate and practice it 
in the future.  After all, technology transfer must consist of transfer of tacit knowledge or 
know-how, which usually must be done deliberately by the technology owner.  Most 
multinational firms exporting technological goods to developing countries do not transfer 
their technology to local producers.  Nor is tacit knowledge transferred.  The technology is 
only transferred to the extent that local producers are able to imitate or reverse engineer the 
technology.  Thus, trade of technological goods may in fact count as unintentional, or more 
aptly, involuntary transfer of technology. 
 235  Imitation can be authorized or unauthorized.  Authorized imitation is tantamount to 
technological licensing.  Unauthorized imitation is copying without consent, sometimes 
called piracy by intellectual property advocates. 
 236  MASKUS, supra note 48, at 136–37. 
 237  JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 116–44, 318–27 (2d ed. 2008). 
 238  Id. at 101–02. 
 239  Id. at 96. 
 240  Id. at 324. 
 241  Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
supra note 75, at 133, 136. 
 242  Id. 
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to the legal regime.  In other words, internalization advantages inform the 
firm’s choice between FDI and licensing. 
Among the three means of intentional technology transfer, FDI 
probably provides the greatest developmental benefits on a developing 
country while trade provides the least.  Through trade, the developing 
country only acquires the good at issue.  Its terms of trade
243
 deteriorate as a 
result.
244
  Any gains in terms of technological capacity would depend on its 
ability to reverse engineer the technology from the product.  If reverse 
engineering is not feasible, the developing country actually enjoys little 
technological gains.  Meanwhile, FDI results in improved productivity, 
which is clearly beneficial to a developing country.
245
  In addition, there 
may be R&D spillover from the multinational firm’s local manufacturing 
facility to its local rivals.
246
  The overriding question to be answered in this 
Part is whether a pro-patent stance in the patent-antitrust interface in 
developing countries can be justified on the grounds that technology 
transfer will be facilitated. 
The patent-antitrust interface implicates technology transfer in a 
number of ways.  The means of technology transfer that is most obviously 
affected by antitrust law is licensing.  Antitrust imposes a host of 
restrictions on patent licensing practices that may influence licensing 
revenue, which in turn augments or reduces the patentee’s incentive to 
license.
247
  Alternatively, if excessive pricing is deemed to be a violation 
under antitrust, as it is in some jurisdictions, antitrust may require the 
patentee to lower its royalty or order compulsory licensing.
248
  This kind of 
intervention will clearly have an impact on technology transfer. 
To the extent that licensing conditions are tightly regulated by 
antitrust, a patentee may choose to pursue FDI instead, or perhaps trade.  In 
this sense, the ability to circumvent antitrust restrictions can be said to be an 
internalization advantage that steers the multinational firm to keep 
 
 243  “Terms of trade is the ratio of export and import prices.”  OECD GLOSSARY OF 
STATISTICAL TERMS 782 (2007).  “Terms of trade” is otherwise defined as the price of a 
country’s exports divided by the price of its imports.  PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE 
OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS THEORY AND POLICY 94 (6th ed. 2008). 
 244  Helpman, supra note 219, at 1274; Scherer & Weisburst, supra note 137, at 1014. 
 245  Andreas Waldkirch, The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico since NAFTA 
16–20, (March 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1115300. 
 246  Economists, however, have cautioned that these benefits should not be overestimated 
as some multinational firms have engaged in what is known as “enclave production,” which 
greatly limits the R&D spillover effect.  MASKUS, supra note 48, at 152. 
 247  For an overview of the restrictions antitrust imposes on licensing, see HOVENKAMP ET 
AL., supra note 7, chs. 21–25. 
 248  For the treatment of the demand for excessive royalty by European Union law, see 
RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 793 (2009). 
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production in-house.  Antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation practices 
may also affect trade by limiting the patentee’s ability to tie the sale of a 
patented product to an unrelated product, or by preventing the patentee from 
specifying the resale price of the patented product.
249
  To the extent that the 
latter is true, the patentee may, for example, choose to invest in the 
developing country at issue and build its own distribution network to sell to 
consumers directly.  In contrast, absent restrictions on resale price 
maintenance, the patentee may choose to export the good to the country. 
Even though much of the trade and development economics literature 
has only examined the relationship between changes in intellectual property 
protection on the one hand, and trade flow, FDI, and technology transfer on 
the other hand, its conclusions can be readily applied to the patent-antitrust 
interface in most instances.  A more pro-patent stance in the interface 
broadens the scope of the patent exploitation and increases patentee 
rewards.  It is no different from increasing patent protection in the form of 
longer patent duration or more vigilant enforcement.  These policy changes 
all result in an increase in patentee rewards.  This is consistent with one of 
the key insights of Professor Louis Kaplow’s analysis: there is little 
economic difference between adjusting the patent length or the patent 
scope.
250
  Therefore, for the purpose of the discussion in this Part, 
expansion of patent protection and a relaxation of antitrust restrictions on 
patent exploitation will be treated as qualitative equivalents as far as their 
effects on patentee rewards are concerned. 
A.  Impact of Relaxation of Antitrust Restrictions on Patent Exploitation on 
Trade Flow 
Whether increased patent protection, and by extension a relaxation of 
antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation, raises or lowers trade flow 
depends on the balance of two effects: the market power effect and the 
market expansion effect.  Market power effect refers to the fact that 
increased patent protection augments the patentee’s market power, and 
reduces the elasticity of demand for its patented product.
251
  This allows the 
patentee to raise price and still earn more profit.  This, of course, would 
require the patentee to reduce its export to the country at issue.
252
  More 
permissive antitrust rules on patent exploitation would similarly allow the 
patentee to extract more profit out of its patent by raising the price or 
imposing restrictions on distribution.  The result would also likely be a drop 
in demand. Market expansion effect results from the elimination or 
 
 249  For an overview of antitrust restrictions on tying involving patented products or resale 
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marginalization of imitated products in the local market, increasing demand 
for the patentee’s product.253 Similarly, reluctance on the part of antitrust to 
compel licensing makes it more difficult for potential competitors to license 
the patented technology to compete with the patentee’s product.254  Again, 
potentially competing products are eliminated or marginalized. 
Whether trade flow increases or decreases depends on the relative 
strength of these two effects, which—economists have postulated and 
subsequently confirmed—in turn depends on the size of the country and the 
presence of local imitation or licensed production capacity.  Maskus and 
Penubarti hypothesize that “the market-expansion effect is likely to 
dominate in larger countries with highly competitive local imitative firms, 
while the market-power effect would be stronger in smaller economies with 
limited ability to imitate.  The effects would be expected to vary sector by 
sector as well.”255  This prediction was largely confirmed by Smith, who 
concluded that whether U.S. exports to a developing country increase or 
decrease depends on the local imitation capacity.
256
 
Trade economists generally believe increased trade enhances global 
welfare and efficiency.
257
  Increased trade allows countries to utilize their 
comparative advantages, improving allocative efficiency on a global 
scale.
258
  This may lead to the conclusion that if increased patent protection 
augments trade flow, developing countries should encourage trade by 
relaxing antitrust rules on patent exploitation.  One must, however, also 
wonder whether it is in a developing country’s best interests to increase its 
import of technological goods, which worsens the developing country’s 
terms of trade, may cause balance of payment issues, and results in the 
relocation of manufacturing facilities to developed countries. 
Both Helpman and Scherer believe that worsening terms of trade will 
be the likely consequence of increased intellectual protection for developing 
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 257  KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 243, at 19–21. 
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  Scherer asserts: 
[P]atent protection may shield product imports from imitative local 
competition, permitting production to be centralized in some other 
nation where economies of scale are exploited more fully or wage 
conditions are more favorable. Lacking such patent protection, 
MNEs may feel compelled to commence on-shore production
260
 in 




As argued earlier, there are reasons why developing country antitrust 
authorities should not focus excessively on global economic efficiency.
262
  
Given their underdeveloped or in some cases impoverished state, 
developing countries are simply not in a position to sacrifice domestic 
consumer and producer welfare for global allocative efficiency.  This is 
vividly illustrated by the previously mentioned example from Jamaica, 
which exempts agreements pertaining to intellectual property from its 
antitrust law at the expense of local consumer welfare.
263
 
It is worth noting that even economists do not believe that adjusting 
patent protection to increase trade flow is necessarily an efficient or optimal 
outcome.  Maskus notes that “the meaning of ‘trade distortion’ is inherently 
ambiguous in the intellectual property context,”264 and that “[t]he optimal 
pattern of production and trade [concerning intellectual property] is 
generally unknown . . . .”265  If increased trade flow on its own is not 
worthy of pursuit, developing countries should only strive for it if it 
redounds other benefits to the country. 
One possible benefit is that increased trade flow facilitates technology 
transfer by allowing developing country producers to reverse engineer the 
technology from the imported product.  In order to do that, a developing 
country firm only needs to import a small number of the product.  Import 
need not be done on a substantial scale to permit reverse engineering.  In 
fact, reverse engineering can be accomplished so long as the developing 
country firm can acquire a sufficient number of sample products somewhere 
in the global market.
266
  Therefore, facilitation of technology transfer as an 
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incidental benefit of increased trade flow does not justify a pro-patent 
stance in the patent-antitrust interface. 
A second possible benefit is that increased trade flow promotes 
growth, which obviously would be beneficial to developing countries.  
Helpman, however, has concluded that openness to trade can increase or 
decrease growth, and that the direction of the effect is ambiguous.
267
  
Absent a stronger showing of benefits from increased trade flow, trade flow 
effects should not be an important consideration in the patent-antitrust 
interface in developing countries. 
B.  Impact of Relaxation of Antitrust Restrictions on Patent Exploitation on 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) creates numerous benefits for 
developing countries.  It brings in new technology and capital goods.
268
  It 
increases local employment.
269
  It introduces new managerial, 
manufacturing, and organizational techniques to the country.
270
  It also 
stimulates local competition and may have spillover effects on local rivals 
that indirectly enhance their efficiency.
271
  FDI may ultimately boost 
economic growth, which is perhaps why developing countries so 
assiduously court foreign investors.
272
  Therefore, to the extent that a pro-
patent stance in the patent-antitrust interface attracts more FDI, it would be 
a substantial boost to the economic prospect of a developing country. 
This is where the matter gets complicated.  Economists have not been 
 
(2011) (discussing, at page 350, how Iran managed to reverse engineer the BGM-71 Tow 
Missile). 
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 269  Syed Zia Abbas Rizvi & Mohammad Nishat, The Impact of Foreign Direct 
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 270  Maskus, supra note 230, at 66–67. 
 271  Id. at 67.  The extent to which FDI results in technology spillover is uncertain.  
Maskus notes that many multinational firms “have been criticized as enclave producers that 
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interests to safeguard their technology and prevent leakage to the local competitors.  Enclave 
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 272  The positive impact of FDI on growth depends on the quality of human capital in the 
recipient country.  Paul Romer, Idea Gaps and Object Gaps in Economic Development, 32 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 543, 555 (1993); Eduardo Borenzstein, Jose de Gregorio & Jing-Wha Lee, 
How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?, 45 J. INT’L ECON. 115, 122 
(1998).  With low educational attainment in the local population, FDI is unlikely to be much 
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able to determine the precise effects increased patent protection—and by 
extension, the relaxation of antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation —
may have on FDI.  After reviewing a host of theoretical studies, Maskus 
concludes that “the relationships between IPRs and FDI are subtle and 
complex.  While the weight of the theory seems to lie on the side of a 
positive impact, the overall impact is ambiguous.”273  The rationale 
underlying this conclusion is intuitive.  Intellectual property protection, 
such as patents, is but one of many considerations for a multinational firm 
when picking an investment destination.  The firm will also consider market 
size and growth, local demand patterns, transport costs and distance from 
markets, low wage costs in relation to labor productivity, and natural 
resources.
274
  If a destination country possesses an overwhelming advantage 
in one or some of these factors, the country’s weakness in intellectual 
property protection may be offset.  Maskus notes: 
[S]trong IPRs are insufficient for generating strong incentives for 
firms to invest in a country.  If that were the case, recent FDI flows 
to developing countries would have gone largely to Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Eastern Europe.  In contrast, Brazil, China, and other 
high-growth, large-market developing economies with weak 
protection would not have attracted nearly as much FDI if 
investment were heavily depended solely on IPRs.
275
 
The indeterminate relationship between intellectual property protection and 
FDI is confirmed by a vast body of empirical literature, which draws 
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Fortunately, there is some guidance on the issue.  First, unsurprisingly, 
the least developing countries receive very little FDI.
277
  Regardless of their 
patent policy, the limited domestic market, low productivity of local labor, 
and underdeveloped human capital cause them to remain unattractive FDI 
locations.
278
  FDI, thus, should not be a significant consideration for these 
countries when deciding patent-antitrust cases.  Meanwhile, countries with 
larger populations are more likely to attract FDI in manufacturing 
facilities.
279
  This is attributed to the desire of multinational firms to gain 
proximate access to local markets.
280
  The extent to which patent protection 
is a consideration in FDI also depends on the stage of production at which 
the investment is targeted.
281
  Understandably, investment in R&D facilities 
is most sensitive to the state of patent protection, while investment in sales 
and distribution is the least dependent.
282
  Manufacturing components and 
complete products, and rudimentary production facilities fall sequentially 
between these investments in descending order of dependence on the state 
of patent protection.
283
  The importance of market size in attracting FDI and 
the disparate sensitivity of FDI in different stages of production to patent 
protection together mean that large developing countries probably need to 
consider the effect of the patent-antitrust interface on FDI.
284
  Lastly, the 
impact of patent protection, and by extension, the patent-antitrust interface, 
on FDI varies by sector.  FDI in low-technology sectors and services, such 
as textiles and apparel, hotel and tourism, and electronics assembly, does 
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not show much sensitivity to patent protection.
285
  In contrast, sectors that 
employ sophisticated yet easily imitable technologies do.
286
 
These empirical observations should help guide developing country 
antitrust authorities as they decide the weight to accord to FDI 
considerations in the patent-antitrust interface. In sectors in which 
technology matters, a developing country antitrust authority should pay 
close attention to how its patent-antitrust decisions influence incentives to 
undertake FDI.  This is particularly true if the country at issue is large and if 
the stage of production is one for which technology and patent exploitation 
is important.  The authority should also be mindful of whether there is any 
potential innovator in a particular sector.  In the absence of any potential for 
developing innovative or imitation capacity, patent policy should be 
accorded less weight. 
One final observation about relaxing patent-antitrust rules to attract 
FDI to developing countries: such effort could turn into a race to the bottom 
for developing countries.  When the first developing country relaxes the 
patent-antitrust rules, it may succeed in attracting FDI.  When the second 
country does the same, it may draw some of the first country’s FDI to itself 
and more FDI from the rest of the developing countries.  By the time all the 
developing countries have adopted the same policy, FDI will be allocated 
based on non-antitrust related considerations, just as it was before the race 
began.
287
  The only consequence for these countries by relaxing the patent-
antitrust rules is to incur all the costs of relaxation, such as consumer 
welfare loss, restricted access to basic necessities, and loss of domestic 
imitation, with little corresponding benefit in technological progress.  This 
is especially true if the principal benefit of FDI is its spillover effects on 
domestic rivals. 
C.  Impact of Relaxation of Antitrust Restrictions on Patent Exploitation on 
Technology Licensing 
The patent-antitrust interface has a direct impact on technology 
licensing, as antitrust regulates the scope of patent exploitation.  By 
reducing a patentee’s licensing revenue and scope of action, tighter 
restrictions on patent exploitation practices may steer patentees to choose 
other forms of technology transfer, such as FDI or trade of technological 
goods.  For example, a prohibition of resale price maintenance imposed on 
the licensees will most likely reduce the patentee’s profit.288  This may drive 
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the patentee to seek other means of technology transfer or even abandon the 
transfer altogether, which would be against the interest of developing 
countries. 
The extent to which antitrust authorities should be concerned about 
technology licensing incentives in patent-antitrust cases depends on the 
existence of domestic firms capable of licensing and commercializing the 
technology.  In the absence of these firms, effects on technology licensing 
incentives deserve little weight in the patent-antitrust interface.  Again, this 
is likely to be true for the vast majority of least-developed countries.  The 
technological capacity to commercialize a licensed technology varies by 
sector.
289
  The remaining developing countries are likely to possess some 
capacity in this respect within certain industries.  Outside of these 
industries, however, developing countries need not give serious 
consideration to licensing incentives in the patent-antitrust interface. 
A decision by a multinational firm to eschew licensing is not 
tantamount to abandonment of technology transfer altogether.  The firm can 
choose other means of transfer if the licensing environment proves 
unfavorable.  The important question then becomes whether developing 
countries should prefer one means of transfer to another.  As established in 
the above discussion, of the three means of technology transfer, licensing is 
probably the most beneficial to the acquisition of technological capacity by 
developing countries.  While trade of technological goods requires reverse 
engineering, and the technological benefits of FDI may be constrained by 
so-called enclave production, technology transfer by way of licensing is 
direct and immediate.  A multinational firm licenses its technology to the 
local licensee.  The firm most often also provides technical assistance and 
transfers tacit knowledge and know-how to ensure that the licensee can 
successfully implement and commercialize the technology.
290
  Local 
technological capacity is unequivocally enhanced. 
D.  Conclusions 
The foregoing discussion suggests that among the three means of 
intentional technological transfer, trade of technological goods should not 
be given much weight in the patent-antitrust interface.  This is due to its 
ineffectiveness as a means of technological transfer and its ambiguous 
impact on the overall welfare of a developing country.  Both FDI and 
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licensing are important means of technological transfer and could 
potentially have a beneficial impact on the domestic welfare of a 
developing country.  Compared to FDI, licensing is a more effective and 
beneficial means of technological transfer, as tacit knowledge and know-
how are also transferred in the process.  Licensing also avoids the problem 
of enclave production that may limit the beneficial impact of technological 
transfer on the domestic economy.  The possibility of licensing, however, 
depends on the existence of domestic firms that can utilize the licensed 
technology.  Likewise, the beneficial spillover effects of FDI on domestic 
firms also depend on the technological capabilities of these firms. 
Myriad factors affect a multinational firm’s FDI decision; patent-
antitrust rules are but one of the considerations.  As suggested earlier, a 
small least-developed country is unlikely to be an attractive FDI destination 
anyway.  Its antitrust authority need not pay much attention to FDI when 
calibrating its patent-antitrust rules.  For countries that are viable FDI 
destinations, the extent to which patent-antitrust rules affect FDI varies by 
the sector and type of investment.  FDI in low-technology sectors are not 
substantially affected by the patent-antitrust interface; the incidence of 
patent-antitrust cases is likely to be lower in low-technology sectors.  The 
same is true for investment in sales and distribution.  For other types of 
investment in sectors in which technology plays a more important role, 
countries will need to consider the impact of the patent-antitrust rules on 
FDI.  Given that patent-antitrust rules are likely to have direct impact on 
licensing, technology transfer by licensing should be a relevant 
consideration for patent-antitrust rules in developing countries.  The weight 
of this consideration is particularly great if licensing, as opposed to FDI, is 
the preferred means of technology transfer by multinational firms. 
VI. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PATENT-ANTITRUST 
INTERFACE 
Aside from its impact on innovation incentives and technology 
transfer, the patent-antitrust interface may have a host of other implications 
for developing countries.  First and foremost, a patent exploitation practice 
may exacerbate the welfare loss that results from the grant of patent 
protection.  A patent exploitation practice may allow the patentee to raise 
the price or restrict the distribution of a patented product even further.  If 
the patented product is a basic necessity, restriction of output raises broader 
development concerns and inflicts further harm on developing countries 
that may not be fully captured by the traditional welfare analysis. 
Deprivation of basic healthcare and nutrition for a substantial part of the 
population will impede a developing country’s ability to move up the 
development ladder.  Finally, refusal to license and other patent exploitation 
practices that impair the domestic firms’ ability to imitate a patented 
technology will retard the acquisition of technological capacity, which, as 
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discussed, is critical to economic growth.  These considerations are closely 
examined in the ensuing discussion. 
A.  Permissive Patent-Antitrust Rules Result in Excessive Consumer 
Welfare Loss 
One of the most serious welfare consequences of permissive patent-
antitrust rules is loss in consumer welfare.  After all, patentee reward comes 
from monopoly profit for the patentee, which in turn must come from 
consumers.  It is textbook economics that following a price increase, 
quantity demanded will fall and a deadweight loss will result.
291
 
Most of the economic studies on the introduction of patent protection 
and its impact on pricing and consumer welfare have emanated from the 
pharmaceutical sector.
292
  They firmly establish that price increases will 
follow the introduction of pharmaceutical patenting.
293
  The same result was 
observed in China after the country voluntarily introduced pharmaceutical 
patenting in the early nineties, well before the country acceded to the World 
Trade Organization.
294
  These economic studies were equally unanimous on 
the welfare effects of such price increases.
295
  Scherer estimates that the 
total surplus accruing to consumers in least-developed countries under 
competitive imitation is four times the surplus they realize under monopoly 
pricing.
296
  The annual welfare loss to India following the introduction of 
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pharmaceutical patenting was estimated to range from U.S.$162 million to 
U.S.$1.26 billion, while annual profit transfer to foreign firms was 
estimated to be between U.S.$101 million and U.S.$839 million.
297
  A 
World Bank study showed that the welfare loss for Argentina, Brazil, India, 
Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan would be in the range of U.S.$3.5 billion to 
U.S.$10.8 billion, while between U.S.$2.1 billion and U.S.$14.4 billion of 
profit would accrue to foreign patent owners.
298
 
The welfare loss in developing countries is exacerbated by the high-
price, low-volume strategy adopted by many pharmaceutical companies in 
developing countries.  A deliberate decision has been made by 
pharmaceutical companies to focus on the wealthiest customers in low-
income developing countries.
299
  For example, it was found in a cross-
country study of the price of Zantac that Mongolian consumers have to pay 
nine times as much for the drug as Australian and New Zealand 
consumers.
300
  Such shocking price discrimination against developing 
country consumers inflicts further welfare losses. 
Aside from general consumer welfare losses, spillovers from 
innovation have contributed to a dramatic increase in the living standards of 
the general public in the industrialized world over the last 2 and 1/2 
centuries.
301
  Baumol argues that if innovators had been able to capture and 
monetize all the private and social benefits of their innovations, society as a 
whole would have been much worse off.
302
  A majority of the population 
would continue to languish in severe poverty.  Furthermore, spreading the 
benefits of innovation to the general public in the form of improved 
healthcare and education may help to improve labor productivity, raising a 
developing country’s output level. 
B.  Impaired Access to Basic Necessities 
From a development perspective, access to basic necessities such as 
foodstuffs and medicine is particularly important.  It is only when 
developing country citizens are healthy and nourished that they can have a 
chance of realizing their full potential and lift themselves out of poverty.  
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Access to basic medicine and education improves the productivity of the 
workforce and the prospects of economic development for a developing 
country.
303
  Therefore, in patent-antitrust cases involving basic necessities, 
development needs should be given extra weight.  A pro-patent stance in 
patent-antitrust cases involving basic necessities may impair availability of 
such necessities.  TRIPS already provides for a mechanism for ordering 
compulsory licensing in the event of a public health emergency under 
Article 31.
304
  In situations not covered by this and other exceptions 
contained in TRIPS, developing countries need to rely on domestic antitrust 
laws to safeguard their consumers’ access to basic necessities.  How this is 
to be done will be elaborated infra in Part VII. 
C.  Stifling of Domestic Imitation 
One possible consequence of a pro-patent stance in the patent-antitrust 
interface is the stifling of technological development in developing 
countries.  After all, exclusion of rivals is the raison d’être of the patent 
system.  Lerner found that strengthening patent protection attracts a greater 
number of foreign patentees, but domestic inventors’ patenting rate usually 
slowed down after the change.
305
  Moreover, he found the slowdown effect 
to be more pronounced in developing countries.
306
  Helpman argues that 
growth rates across nations would converge if R&D spillovers were 
international in scope and knowledge was shared across borders.
307
  On the 
contrary: “If, for example, the R&D performed by these industrial countries 
enhanced their common knowledge stock but did not feed knowledge into 
the less-developed countries, then international R&D spillovers would 
provide a major force of divergence between the rich North and the poor 
South.”308  One of the most direct means of R&D spillover is imitation.309  
The importance of imitation as a means for acquiring technological capacity 
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is underscored by the experience of industrialized economies, many of 
which suppressed patent protection in the early stages of their development. 
History is replete with instances of countries eschewing patent 
protection to allow themselves to catch up with the global technological 
leader, which for most of the nineteenth century was the U.K.
310
  The 
United States was a major culprit of intellectual property infringements in 
the nineteenth century, copying patented technologies from the U.K. and 
denying foreign authors copyright protection in order to give its low-cost 
domestic printing industry a boost.
311
  The United States developed its early 
industrial capacity by free-riding on the innovations developed by the 
leading European nations.  Examples include U.S. free-riding on the U.K. 
for textiles, steam engines, and machinery, and France for gunpowder.
312
  In 
fact, until 1836, foreigners were not allowed to obtain patents in the United 
States unless they had resided in the country for at least two years and 
declared their intent to naturalize.
313
  As the U.S. economy industrialized 
and the number of domestic inventors rose, a growing demand for 
heightened intellectual property protection emerged.  In response, Congress 
progressively increased the strength of patents and other intellectual 
property rights throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.
314
 
A similar strategy of free-riding or cheap-riding was adopted by other 
developed nations, such as Japan, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, in their 
early stages of development.
315
  Japan’s patent system initially was 
designed to facilitate technology transfer.  It was only remodeled in the 
1980s and 1990s to reflect its role as a major source of innovation in the 
world.  In the late-nineteenth century: 
Japan did adopt a comprehensive patent regime, though its features 
were distinctive from the American and major European systems.  It 
was designed to encourage industrial development through 
emphasizing technology acquisition from abroad, domestic 
information diffusion, and incremental innovation. In short, the 
system was developed with the interests of a technology follower in 
mind.  The Japanese regime significantly limited patent scope and 
breadth.  For example, pharmaceutical patents were not provided 
until the 1970s . . . . As Japan matured into an industrial power and 
technological leader, features of its patent system attracted increasing 
complaints from both foreign and domestic enterprises, leading to its 
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Similar to the United States, foreigners were initially barred from 
applying for patents in Japan.
317
  This discriminatory policy only ended in 
1899, when Japan acceded to the Paris Convention.
318
  Even after the 
Second World War, the patent system and intellectual property were 
generally only seen as “one component of a broader complex of policies for 
trade, industry, and technology that focused on reconstruction and ‘catch-
up’ with the West, especially the United States.”319 
Switzerland adopted a similar anti-patent strategy in its development.  
Despite repeated attempts to introduce a patent system, Switzerland only 
adopted one after the domestic watch industry had become threatened by 
foreign imitation and technologically sophisticated enough to benefit from 
it.
320
  Even then, the original patent law only provided protection to 
mechanical inventions, but not chemical inventions.
321
  This was a 
deliberate policy choice as the domestic watch industry only produced 
mechanical inventions.
322
  Meanwhile, the emerging Swiss chemical 
industry wanted to catch up with its more advanced German counterpart by 
way of imitation.
323
  The domestic chemical industry, alongside the textile 
industry—which also relied heavily on foreign technology—strongly 
opposed the introduction of a patent system.
324
  It was, hence, in 
Switzerland’s interest to deny patent protection for chemical compounds.  
Switzerland did not extend patent protection to chemicals until Germany 
threatened trade sanctions in 1907.
325
 
Swept by the anti-patent movement that was fomenting in Continental 
Europe in the mid-nineteenth century, the Netherlands abolished its patent 
system in July 1869.
326
  The abolition was not entirely motivated by 
strategic development concerns, and the patent system was eventually 
reestablished in 1910.
327
  A number of economists have concluded that the 
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Netherlands industrialized successfully in the absence of a patent system.
328
  
Even the U.K., a technological leader in the world for much of the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century, excluded chemical compounds from 




This brief historical overview shows that many industrialized 
economies deliberately chose, as a strategy for technology acquisition, to 
suppress patent rights to allow domestic industries to imitate cutting-edge 
foreign technology.  Their experiences lead to the inevitable conclusion that 
“the patent system in particular, ha[s] been neither necessary nor sufficient 
for historically significant technical and/or economic progress at national 
and company level.”330  If the goal is the acquisition of technological 
competence in the shortest time possible, developing countries should try to 
facilitate domestic imitation rather than stifle it.  Professors Boldrin and 
Levine call imitation “a powerful tool of economic development” and “key 
components of the competitive markets that benefit us on a daily basis.”331  
It is only when the domestic firms have acquired the technological capacity 
to imitate that these countries should turn their attention to spurring 
domestic innovation. 
This conclusion is supported by the experiences of a number of 
developing countries, such as India, whose domestic pharmaceutical 
industry blossomed after the country abolished pharmaceutical patents,
332
 
and South Korea and Taiwan, which aggressively imitated technologies 
from the United States and Japan, among others.
333
  In fact, the benefits of 
imitation extend beyond the acquisition of technological capacity to the 
attainment of more inclusive growth.  As suggested earlier, inclusive 
growth requires that the fruits of economic growth be shared broadly within 
society,
334
 which means that small- and medium-sized enterprises should be 
allowed to prosper.  Studies show that such enterprises often engage in 
imitative activity.
335
  Stifling of imitation, hence, would harm these 
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enterprises and undermine the attainment of inclusive growth. 
The most direct way to facilitate imitation is by lowering, or even 
eliminating, patent protection.  Many developing countries did just that in 
the 1960s and 1970s with pharmaceutical patents.
336
  With the signing of 
the TRIPS Agreement, this option is no longer available.
337
  The room for 
adjusting the level of patent protection has been severely curtailed.  One 
possible way out of this quagmire is to adopt an aggressive stance in 
antitrust enforcement in patent cases.  By limiting a patentee’s ability to 
impose restrictions on licensees, and perhaps by making it easier for rivals 




VII.  SOME PROPOSED GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
A.  Guiding Principles 
Based on the foregoing discussion, a number of guiding principles can 
be offered to developing countries on how they can adjust the prevailing 
approaches to patent-antitrust cases in developed countries to suit their 
particular needs.  Given that antitrust law is most established in developed 
country jurisdictions, developing countries will likely look to developed 
country jurisprudence when confronted by novel patent-antitrust issues.  
However, the crux of the argument in this Article is that developing 
countries cannot blindly follow developed country approaches, and instead 
need to tailor these approaches to suit their needs.  The following are a 
number of principles that will assist developing countries in this adjustment 
process. 
The first guiding principle is that developing countries need to be 
prepared to ask tough questions about innovation-based justifications for 
patent exploitation practices.  Patent protection is not essential for 
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technology requires significant tacit knowledge to implement, which can be most readily 
obtained from the licensor. 
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generating innovation incentives in a great many industries.
339
  The 
importance of patent protection depends on the appropriability conditions of 
the industry at issue, and in particular, on the existence and relative 
importance of other types of appropriation mechanisms, such as first-mover 
advantages, brand and marketing, and learning curve advantages.
340
  While 
developed country competition authorities may choose to ignore this large 
body of evidence and continue to defer to innovation incentives-based 
arguments for patent rights, developing country authorities are not in a 
position to commit the same mistake.  There are two reasons for this. 
First, the patentee reward that is generated by supra-competitive 
pricing ultimately is derived from consumers.
341
  While developed country 
consumers may be wealthy enough to withstand a consumer welfare loss, 
developing country consumers are not.  Every penny lost to them may have 
a real impact on their standard of living.  Therefore, developing country 
competition authorities should be very careful about incurring consumer 
welfare loss. 
Second, there are more potential innovators in developed countries to 
benefit from the innovation incentives generated by the patent system and 
preserved by the antitrust rules.  The same is not true of developing 
countries, especially the least-developed ones.  The innovative capacity of a 
developing country probably differs by sector.  However, in general, it is 
true that developing countries possess less innovative capacity than 
developed countries.
342
  If a developed country accepts an innovation 
incentives-based argument and upholds a patent exploitation practice, the 
patentee reward still redounds to domestic firms.  In a developing country, 
the patentee reward is likely to go from the pocket of domestic consumers 
to foreign firms, as there may be few innovators in the country to take 
advantage of the innovation incentives generated by the patent system.  
Therefore, developing country antitrust authorities must scrutinize 
innovation incentives-based arguments more closely and be less deferential 
to patent policy than developed country authorities. 
A related issue is innovation incentives externalities.  As suggested 
earlier, the effect of innovation incentives generated by a domestic patent 
system is not confined to its national boundary; a patent system may 
provide incentives to foreign inventors as well.
343
  The extent to which that 
is true depends on the size of the domestic market.  While it may be true for 
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some large, middle-income developing countries, for most of the least-
developed nations it is unlikely that the innovation incentives generated by 
their domestic patent systems will be taken into consideration by foreign 
inventors.  Every developing country must come to its own determination 
about two questions: (1) how likely it is that the innovation incentives 
generated by its domestic patent system will be taken into account by 
foreign inventors, and (2) even if the answer to question (1) is positive, 
whether it wants to sacrifice domestic consumer welfare to incentivize 
foreign inventors, many of which are multinational corporations.  If the 
answer to question (2) is negative, then that developing country’s 
competition authority needs to attach even less weight to innovation 
incentives-based arguments when tackling a patent-antitrust case involving 
a foreign patentee. 
A second guiding principle for developing countries is that a sector-
specific approach to patent-antitrust cases is required, given that the 
importance of patent protection as a source of innovation incentives varies 
widely by industry.  While a de novo examination of appropriability 
conditions in every case may be too time-consuming and resource-intensive 
for any antitrust authority or court to undertake, a priori classifications of 
industries can certainly be made to facilitate the analysis.  A sector-specific 
approach is also consistent with the finding that the importance of 
innovation incentives to technology transfer and FDI varies by industry. 
Third, developing countries need to bear in mind that the most 
effective way for many of them to acquire technological capacity is by 
imitation.  This is what many developed countries themselves did when 
they were moving up the global technological ladder.
344
  Given the 
importance of technological progress to growth and development—as stated 
earlier, growth rates will continue to diverge absent a technological catch-
up—developing country competition authorities should facilitate domestic 
imitation of foreign technologies and technology transfer to the extent 
consistent with conventional antitrust principles.  Developing country 
competition authorities should be more willing to impose a duty to license 
on the patentee and to scrutinize licensing agreements for unduly excessive 
restrictions on the licensees.
345
 
Fourth, developing country competition authorities should be 
particularly vigilant about protecting domestic consumer welfare.
346
  Given 
the general impoverished state of most domestic consumers, they can ill-
afford to sacrifice their welfare in the name of generating innovation 
incentives.  Some goods are likely to be much more important to domestic 
consumer welfare than others.  For example, access to basic necessities, 
 
 344  See discussion supra Part VI.C. 
 345  See discussion supra Part IV.E. 
 346  See discussion supra Part VI.A. 
  
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:1 (2012) 
68 
such as foodstuffs and medicine, will likely have a more direct bearing on 
consumer welfare than, say, access to luxury goods or fancy consumer 
electronics.  Not every consumer should be treated the same, even within a 
developing country, especially given the severe income inequality prevalent 
in most of them.  A restrictive patent exploitation practice affecting a 
technology that is so advanced and expensive that it is only consumed by 
the wealthiest consumers deserves less attention than one that implicates a 
basic necessity.  The wealthiest consumers in a developing country are 
often just as able to withstand a welfare loss as consumers in developed 
countries.  Meanwhile, a patent exploitation practice that curtails the supply 
of basic necessities will have disproportionate impact on the poorest of 
developing country consumers.  A developing country antitrust authority 
therefore should take a particularly pro-antitrust stance in cases involving 
such a practice.  This is especially true given that access to basic necessities 
carries a special developmental dimension in that it affects an individual’s 
ability to achieve self-fulfillment. 
Fifth, the welfare of domestic small- and medium-sized enterprises 
should feature prominently in the calculus of developing country 
competition authorities.  In particular, these authorities need to pay closer 
attention to the effect of patent exploitation practices on domestic small- 
and medium-sized enterprises.  This is because of the role played by these 
enterprises in alleviating poverty and providing an opportunity for the 
impoverished to improve their economic well-being.  As noted earlier, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises are often the most effective means for 
the poor to move up the socio-economic ladder.
347
  Developing country 
competition authorities should be wary of domestic small- and medium-
sized enterprises being excluded from the market by patent exploitation 
practices, denying their owners of the opportunity to move out of poverty. 
Sixth, developing countries need to take the argument that a pro-
antitrust stance on patent-antitrust cases may undermine technology transfer 
and FDI with circumspection.  The connection between the patent-antitrust 
rules and technology transfer is complex and varied.  As far as trade flow as 
a means of technological transfers is concerned, it has been established that 
a developing country firm only needs to import a small amount of the 
relevant product to reverse engineer the technology.
348
  Import need not be 
done on a substantial scale to permit reverse engineering.
349
  Therefore, 
facilitation of technology transfer as an incidental benefit of increased trade 
flow does not justify a pro-patent stance in the patent-antitrust interface.  As 
the OLI paradigm suggests, there are many factors that determine the choice 
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of an FDI destination.
350
  The patent-antitrust rules are only a small part of 
the calculus.  Economic evidence fails to reach a conclusive relationship 
between FDI and intellectual property protection, and by extension, the 
patent-antitrust rules.  Country-specific factors may affect the attractiveness 
of the country as an FDI destination.  For example, there are developing 
countries that are such unattractive FDI destinations due to the size of the 
domestic market and other reasons that even extremely favorable patent-
antitrust rules are not going to matter.
351
  These include the small and least-
developed countries.
352
  Meanwhile, developing countries with larger 
populations may be more viable FDI destinations, and therefore may need 
to be concerned with how its patent-antitrust rules affect FDI. 
The seventh point is one that has not been raised earlier, but is a 
necessary implication of the foregoing analysis and discussion.  The 
imperative of protecting consumers from supra-competitive pricing and 
domestic firms from being denied opportunities to acquire imitation 
capacity means that developing country antitrust authorities may need to be 
more vigilant against excessive pricing and more ready to order compulsory 
licensing.
353
  For a product that incorporates a highly valuable and perhaps 
unique technology, there may be no meaningful close substitutes in the 
market, and the patentee may possess so much market power that it can 
maximize its reward without engaging in any restrictive patent exploitation 
practices.  All it has to do is sell the product at a monopolistic price.  In 
these circumstances, the only way for the antitrust authority to alleviate the 
consumer welfare loss is either to find the patentee guilty of excessive 
pricing and impose some sort of price regulation remedy, or to order 
compulsory licensing to introduce competition into the market.  If the 
product is a necessity, and the industry at issue is one in which patent 
protection is only a secondary source of innovation incentives, the 
justification for the proposed intervention would be strong. 
It is true that most developed country antitrust authorities are averse to 
imposing price regulation.  The desire to avoid such regulations was one of 
the reasons cited by the United States Supreme Court in refusing to impose 
an antitrust duty to deal in Trinko.
354
  Yet developed and developing 
countries may stand in different stead as far as the need for price 
interventions is concerned.  Some economists have argued that developing 
countries should impose price regulation of some kind to alleviate the 
harmful effects of patent protection, especially for pharmaceutical 
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  The Indian government has long regulated the prices of 
medicine.
356
  Such regulation is usually administered by some sectoral 
regulator instead of the antitrust authority.
357
  To the extent that price 
regulation is already handled by a different government body, a developing 
country’s antitrust authority can take a more hands-off approach.  However, 
not every good is subject to price control, and antitrust authorities may 
confront cases involving products that are not subject to such control.  In 
those cases, a remedy of price regulation of some kind may be called for. 
Compulsory licensing is equally, if not more, controversial than price 
regulation within the antitrust circles.
358
  It is controversial because it is 
considered a direct affront to the very essence of a patent: the right to 
exclude competitors.  Moreover, it contradicts the nature of patents as a 
property.  In developed countries, especially in the United States, private 
property is highly respected and a government order to compel sharing of 
private property is regarded with the utmost suspicion, and rightly so.  
Compulsory licensing, however, is also superior to price regulation as a tool 
for tackling supra-competitive pricing.  First, compulsory licensing 
introduces competition to the market.
359
  Not only will the price be lower 
for consumers, competition will also hopefully induce the firms to cut costs 
and achieve production efficiency.  Allocative efficiency is likely to be 
improved by compulsory licensing as compared to a price-regulated market.  
Second, compulsory licensing creates a huge benefit to developing 
countries by allowing local firms to practice advanced technology.
360
  This 
will result in a boost to the local technological capacity.  The fact that a 
number of firms now practice the technology also increases the probability 
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and quality of further improvements and cumulative innovation.  
Commentators have argued that the firm best able to make follow-on 
innovations need not be the original inventor.
361
  Increasing the availability 
of a technology improves the probability of follow-on innovation. 
Notwithstanding property rights-based arguments, the strongest 
objection to compulsory licensing has usually been that it undermines 
innovation incentives.  The standard theoretical argument is that if potential 
inventors know that they will be subject to compulsory licensing, they will 
be less willing to invest in creating new inventions.
362
  To the extent that 
innovation incentives depend on patentee reward, this argument has great 
intuitive appeal.  This argument, however, is not supported by the empirical 
evidence.  Both Scherer and the Yale survey found that compulsory 
licensing does not undermine innovation incentives in most industries.
363
  
These results are consistent with the central conclusion from the bulk of the 
studies discussed in Part IV that patent protection is not the most important 
source of innovation incentives for most industries.  The only two industries 
which the Yale survey identified as being adversely affected by compulsory 
licensing were the metal container and electron tube industries.
364
  For the 
remainder of the industries covered in their exhaustive survey, compulsory 
licensing was not deemed to be an important concern. 
Compulsory licensing is, in fact, not as rare as it is generally believed 
to be.  U.S. antitrust authorities have regularly imposed compulsory 
licensing in Section 2 monopolization and merger cases in the past.  For 
example, the GE-Westinghouse monopoly over the electric lamp was 
broken by royalty-free compulsory licensing.
365
  AT&T was ordered to 
license 9,000 of its patents in 1956.
366
  In both cases, there was no 
observable deterioration in innovation incentives.
367
  Until TRIPS came into 
effect and Canada joined NAFTA, both the U.K. and Canada had 
compulsory licensing laws.  The U.K. law applied to all kinds of products 
while Canada’s only applied to pharmaceuticals.368  Canada’s law, in 
particular, was utilized extensively: 227 licenses were issued between 1969 
and 1977.
369
  In short, developing countries should not shy away from 
compulsory licensing if it is warranted by an antitrust violation.  
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Commenting on the general aversion to compulsory licensing in the U.S. 
antitrust circles, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp asserts that “ordering 
compulsory licensing for a proven antitrust violation is no different than 
fining a firm or ordering divestiture of a plant.  While we do not want to 
deter innovation, we do want to deter antitrust violations either.”370  
Professor Hovenkamp was right to observe that we want to deter antitrust 
violations, especially those that directly undermine the growth prospects of 
developing nations. 
Compulsory licensing would only be a meaningful remedy if there 
were other producers in the local market capable of commercializing the 
technology.  If there are no local producers in a particular industry, as is 
likely to be case in many small developing countries, there would be no one 
to whom to license the technology.  While compulsory licensing as an 
antitrust remedy need not be granted to domestic producers, Article 31 of 
the TRIPS Agreement requires the products produced under compulsory 
licensing to be predominantly for local use.
371
  Commentators have disputed 
the precise scope of this limitation.
372
  However, it is unlikely that large-
scale export of products produced under compulsory licensing would be 
compatible with Article 31.  Therefore, for a developing country that 
possesses no local capacity to manufacture the product, and whose market 
is too small to allow foreign firms to reap sufficient scale economies to 
build a local plant, direct price regulation may be the only feasible remedy 
available to its antitrust authority. 
B.  Illustrative Examples 
How these guiding principles can be applied in real cases can be 
illustrated with a number of examples.  Assume that a multinational 
agricultural product company has developed a genetically modified seed 
that produces a significantly improved yield.  The company would only sell 
the seed to farmers in a least-developed country if that country’s farmers 
also purchase fertilizers from the company.  The market share for the seed 
is less than 30%.  This is a typical tying case.
373
  Further assume that this 
seed is for a staple in this country—many residents of this country rely on it 
as their basic foodstuff—but the country has no current innovative capacity 
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in genetic engineering and modification of agricultural products, and no 
realistic chance of developing any such capacity.  There are simply no 
agricultural companies in the country engaged in any meaningful genetic 
research at the moment.  The country is also too small and too deficient in 
human capital to be a viable FDI destination for multinational agricultural 
companies.  Meanwhile, there are small domestic enterprises producing 
fertilizers that would be excluded from the fertilizer market by the 
multinational company’s tying conduct.  The multinational company 
justifies its tie on the ground that it needs to maximize its returns from its 
patented genetically modified seed.
374
 
Tying would be analyzed under U.S. antitrust law under the modified 
per se rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish Hospital 
District No. 2 v. Hyde.
375
  Under this modified per se rule, the plaintiff must 
show that: (1) there are two separate products; (2) the defendant has 
substantial market power in the tying product market; (3) there is actual 
evidence that the seller has coerced the buyer to accept the tied product; and 
(4) the amount of interstate commerce affected in the tied product market is 
not insubstantial.
376
  Jefferson Parish has been understood to establish a 
presumption that less than 30% market share is insufficient to satisfy the 
market power in the tying product market requirement.
377
  Therefore, the 
tying practice of this multinational company would be unlikely to be held 
illegal under U.S. law. 
However, the competition authority of this developing country would 
be well-advised to look beyond U.S. law and to apply a more stringent 
standard to this tying practice for a variety of reasons.  First, to scrutinize 
the innovation incentive argument put forward by the defendant, the 
developing country at issue is a very small one, and hence the profits 
obtained from this country are unlikely to feature prominently in the R&D 
investment calculus of the company at issue.  Moreover, the competition 
authority may rightfully wonder whether welfare of the consumers in this 
country should be sacrificed to generate innovation incentives for this 
multinational corporation.  Second, the tie is likely to have substantial 
impact on the consumers and fertilizer producers of the country.  
Presumably the defendant is selling the fertilizer at a higher price than the 
prevailing domestic price.  If domestic farmers are forced to pay a higher 
price for fertilizers, they may be compelled to raise the price of their 
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produce.  Given that the crop is a staple in the country, an increased price is 
likely to have a pronounced impact on consumer welfare.  The tie is also 
said to exclude domestic fertilizer producers from the market.  Domestic 
small- and medium-sized enterprises are set to suffer as a result.  Lastly, 
given that there are no domestic agricultural companies engaged in high-
level research at the moment and the country is not a viable FDI destination 
for multinational agricultural companies, the competition authority need not 
worry about the impact of its decision on technology transfer or the 
development of domestic innovative capacity.  The competition authority of 
this developing country should prohibit this tie. 
As another example, assume that in a rapidly industrializing 
developing country with a fairly large population, there is a firm developing 
a technology in food processing that will compete with the prevailing 
international standard.  However, for the firm to successfully produce 
products incorporating this new technology, it must obtain licenses to some 
technology held by a foreign firm that currently deploys the internationally-
prevailing technology.  To forestall emerging competition, the foreign firm 
refuses to license the required technology to the domestic firm.  As a 
rapidly industrializing developing country with a substantial population, it 
is a viable FDI destination.  There are a sufficient number of domestic firms 
in the relevant industry that can benefit from technology transfer from 
developed country firms.  Also, a substantial number of firms possess 
imitative and innovative capacity in the industry at issue. 
Under prevailing U.S. antitrust law, it is exceedingly difficult to 
prevail in a unilateral refusal to license claim.  Under the leading case on 
this issue from the Federal Circuit, In re Independent Service Organizations 
Antitrust Litigation (Xerox), a patentee’s refusal to deal will not be 
questioned absent fraud on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, sham 
litigation, or illegal tying.
378
  In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems 
Support Corp., the First Circuit did not go as far as the Federal Circuit, but 
nonetheless proclaimed that “while exclusionary conduct can include a 
monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author’s desire to 
exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid 
business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.”379  Even in 
the more permissive case of Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak, 
the Ninth Circuit only upheld an imposition of a duty to deal because the 
court found that the defendant’s intellectual property justification for 
refusing to deal was only pretextual.
380
  According to these leading cases, 
unilateral refusal to license is practically presumptively legal under U.S. 
antitrust law.  Should the competition authority in this country deviate from 
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prevailing U.S. law and condemn the unilateral refusal to license the 
required technology? 
Imposing a duty to deal is the most direct affront to the patent right to 
exclude.  Hence, it directly implicates the innovation incentive rationale of 
patent rights.  In deciding whether to impose a duty to deal, the competition 
authority of this country should be reminded of the copious economic 
evidence that patent protection is not essential for generating innovation 
incentives in every industry.  Food processing is not one of the industries 
which economists have found to rely on patent protection for innovation 
incentives.
381
  Therefore, imposing a duty to deal over this technology will 
have less direct impact on innovation incentives.  Yet, the calculus for this 
competition authority is somewhat complicated by the fact that the 
innovation incentives generated by the domestic patent system benefit both 
foreign and domestic firms.  As noted earlier, domestic firms in the industry 
also possess innovative capacity.  Therefore, setting a precedent of 
imposing a duty to license may affect both foreign and domestic firms.  
Also, the competition authority must be mindful of how imposing a duty to 
deal may affect technology transfer and foreign investment, as the country 
is a viable FDI destination and there are domestic firms that may benefit 
from technology transfer.  The authority will have to undertake a detailed 
analysis of the likely impact of imposing a duty to deal on foreign 
investment and technology transfer.  Against all these potentially adverse 
impacts is the facilitation of the acquisition of domestic innovative capacity 
by the firm seeking to license and possible lower prices for consumers after 
the introduction of a competing technology.  The authority may want to 
take into account the fact that the refusal to license was motivated by a 
desire to forestall competition from an emerging technology.  It will need to 
balance all these countervailing considerations to reach a conclusion.  As 
compared to the prevailing U.S. approach, a developing country 
competition authority must demonstrate greater willingness to question the 
extent to which patent protection is needed to generate innovation 
incentives.  It must also consider a wider range of development-related 
considerations. 
VIII.   POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES 
A.  Compatibility with the TRIPS Agreement 
One possible criticism of the guiding principles proposed above is that 
they may be incompatible with the TRIPS Agreement.  The TRIPS 
Agreement mandates a minimum level of patent protection by all member 
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 and hence, may restrict the ability of developing countries to 
curtail patent protection by way of antitrust law.
383
  In particular, the TRIPS 
Agreement prohibits the institution of different levels of patent protection 
for different industries.
384
  This may further restrict the flexibility of action 
for developing countries. 
Fortunately, the TRIPS Agreement expressly allows member states to 
enact measures to control anticompetitive practices related to intellectual 
property rights.  First, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement allows member 
states to adopt appropriate measures “to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology.”385  Article 8 is said to contain a proportionality requirement, 
and antitrust restrictions of patent exploitation may not be excessively 
broad.
386
  However, it has been said that this requirement still leaves “a 
large margin of application to Member countries, since it is their role to 
determine what represents an abuse of intellectual property rights.”387  
Furthermore, Article 40 specifically allows member states to adopt 
measures to control anticompetitive practices in the patent licensing 
context.
388
  Under Article 40, an anticompetitive practice is defined as a 
practice that “constitute[s] an abuse of intellectual property rights having an 
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.”389  Member states 
enjoy considerable leeway in their interpretation and application of this 
phrase.
390
  Article 40 enumerates three examples of anticompetitive 
practices: exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges 
to validity, and coercive package licensing.
391
  These three examples are not 
exhaustive and a member state is free to specify further examples of 
anticompetitive practices.
392
  Moreover, Article 40 requires member states 
 
 382  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 371, arts. 27–31, 36–39. 
 383  Professors Boldrin & Levine have implicitly characterized the TRIPS Agreement as 
rent-seeking by multinational corporation.  See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 74, at 175 
(“[T]he equalization of globalization with the need for stronger intellectual property laws is 
just plain and simple rent-seeking propaganda from existing monopolies.”).  They argue that 
the increased monopoly rent available to multinational corporations following the expansion 
in size of the global market should more than compensate their innovation costs. 
 384  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 371, art. 27. 
 385  Id. art. 8. 
 386  SECRETARIAT OF THE U.N. CONF ON TRADE & DEV., THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 54 (1996). 
 387  Id. 
 388  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 371, art. 40. 
 389  Id. 
 390  M.B. RAO & MANJULA GURU, UNDERSTANDING TRIPS—MANAGING KNOWLEDGE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 218 (2003). 
 391  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 371, art. 40. 
 392  RAO & GURU, supra note 390, at 213. 
  
A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface 
33:1 (2012) 
77 
to determine the legality of a practice on a case-by-case basis.
393
  This is 




The TRIPS Agreement is unlikely to pose obstacles to the application 
of the proposed guiding principles.  The regulation of anticompetitive 
practices related to intellectual property rights is expressly permitted by 
Articles 8 and 40.
395
  The flexibility of application allowed by both articles 
means that developing countries should have the ability to apply the guiding 
principles proposed in this Article for patent-antitrust cases.  Professor 
Eleanor Fox has argued that TRIPS does not impose a categorical limit on 
how far domestic antitrust law can restrict intellectual property rights, but 
instead allows for a case-by-case approach to ascertaining these limits.
396
  
She further argues that under TRIPS, there is an implicit presumption that 
“existing developed systems of antitrust are presumptively legitimate.”397  
Therefore, as long as the approach fashioned by the developing countries 
does not deviate significantly from the existing approaches of the 
established jurisdictions, it should be compliant with TRIPS. 
Moreover, the proposed guiding principles do not call for a per se 
approach, but instead requires a case-by-case evaluation that is required by 
Article 40.  In any case, it has been suggested that Article 40 should not 
prevent developing countries from adopting per se approaches to the 
regulation of patent exploitation practices or other approaches that “form 
part of the traditional antitrust enforcement used by some countries.”398  
Given the prevalence of Rule of Reason balancing approaches in developed 
country jurisdictions, it can hardly be argued that the application of the 
guiding principles proposed in this Article is inconsistent with the 
international mainstream. 
The TRIPS Agreement requires national treatment and does not allow 
member states to discriminate against foreign right holders.
399
  One may 
argue that according different weights to the interests of domestic and 
foreign inventors may run afoul of the principle of national treatment.  
While this principle requires formal equality of treatment between foreign 
and domestic right holders, it is unlikely to go so far as requiring the 
interests of domestic and foreign right holders to be given equal weight in 
the analysis undertaken in administrative or judicial proceedings. 
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B.  Administrability 
A second possible criticism of the proposed guiding principles is that 
they are too vague to be applied.  It may be further argued that the range of 
issues to be considered in the application of the guiding principles is 
beyond the capability of any antitrust authority, let alone those in 
developing countries, to decide.  Antitrust authorities and courts are simply 
not equipped to weigh policy factors such as the impact on FDI or the 
degree of necessity of a product. 
While there is some truth to these claims, the alternative would be to 
ignore all these vital developmental concerns and decide patent-antitrust 
cases under a veil of willful obliviousness to the reality of developing 
countries.  The result would be decisions that stifle technological progress, 
inflict harm on downtrodden consumers, and retard the growth and 
development of these countries.  The adjustment under the guiding 
principles is marked by considerable open-endedness, and mistakes may be 
made in the process.  However, the best is the enemy of the good.  The fact 
that a comprehensive framework that attempts to take into account all the 
relevant policy considerations cannot be applied in a precise manner does 
not mean that these considerations should be dropped from the analysis 
altogether.  A simple rule that permits all patent exploitation practices short 
of cartel conduct would be easy to administer, but would no doubt be 
detrimental to developing countries.  Instead, antitrust authorities should 
strive to incorporate relevant considerations and come to the best decision 
under the circumstances. 
The reality is that Rule of Reason type balancing in antitrust cases will 
always require judgment calls in close cases.  These judgment calls are 
made in light of the general jurisprudential and socio-economic 
presumptions in a particular jurisdiction.  In the United States, the 
presumption is that competitive markets work, and thus, courts tend to err 
on the side of non-enforcement in close cases to give markets the 
opportunity to rectify the anticompetitive conduct.  Other jurisdictions have 
less faith in the market and therefore tend to err on the side of enforcement 
in close cases.  Similarly, in patent-antitrust cases, developing country 
authorities can decide close cases with the view that when in doubt, err on 
the side of protecting domestic consumers and potential imitators.  In a 
way, the guiding principles identified in Part VIII can be treated as 
presumptions that break the tie in close cases. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes some guiding principles for the patent-antitrust 
interface that incorporates a broad range of developmental concerns.  It 
argues that such a guiding principles will better suit the circumstances of 
developing countries and ensure that the opportunities they have to achieve 
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economic growth and development are not needlessly lost.  The approach in 
this Article has two implications that resonate beyond the immediate topic 
of the patent-antitrust interface in developing countries.  First, even for 
developed jurisdictions, such as the United States, this Article demonstrates 
that patent protection is not the most important source of innovation 
incentives in most industries.  This means that the antitrust authorities and 
the courts in these jurisdictions should re-examine the deference they have 
shown to patent policy.  The pendulum may have swung too far and the 
patent-antitrust interface in these jurisdictions needs to be brought back to 
the middle ground. 
Second, for global antitrust, this Article is an implicit challenge to the 
drive for convergence that has consumed the international antitrust 
community in the last decade.  One of the underlying premises of this 
Article is that antitrust principles and doctrines need to be tailored to 
domestic economic circumstances.  Markets and economies function 
differently in different countries and antitrust law needs to reflect these 
differences.  Legal doctrines that have served developed countries well are 
not necessarily suitable for developing countries.  This is a particularly 
important lesson for developing countries as they are prone to copy the 
approaches of established jurisdictions without local adaptation.  The 
exemption granted by the Jamaican antitrust law for intellectual property 
agreements vividly illustrates the danger of such an indiscriminate 
approach.  Meanwhile, advocates for convergence should become aware of 
the limits of a one-size-fits-all approach.  Convergence has undoubtedly 
been a positive development in international antitrust, but it can backfire if 
pushed too far.  In the context of patent-antitrust cases, especially those 
involving foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals, the consequence in developing 
countries of injudicious convergence could be dire. 
 
